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INTRODUCTION
"The chinaman has impoverished our country, degraded
our free labor, and hoodlumized our children. He is now
destroying our young men with opium. '
The first anti-narcotic law, which outlawed the smoking of
opium, according to the police chief, was designed to "keep
[the Chinese] from opening places where whites might re-
sort to smoke.",
2
[T]here is a violent war being fought in America. For many
years this war was fought for us by special agents in dark,
stinking alleys-through garbage strewn streets, and in the
burned out, abandoned buildings of our large metropolitan
areas. But now, the battleground has moved into middle-
class neighborhoods, into glass skyscrapers, and even into
school playgrounds. This war was once fought only in ur-
ban America, but increasingly, there are daily skirmishes on
country roads, on remote rural routes, and in the tree-lined
streets of small towns and villages.
-Senator Heflin during the crack cocaine debates.3
1. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 775 n.10 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (referencing
this quote from an 1879 San Francisco Post article, in support of the contention that
"[m]edia accounts and inaccurate data influenced public opinion about smoking opium").
2. DIANA R. GORDON, THE RETURN OF THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: DRUG PROHIBI-
TION AND POLICY POLITICS 143 (1994) (quoting Jim Baumohl, The 'Dope Fiend's Paradise'
Revisited: Notes from Research in Progress on Drug Law Enforcement in San Francisco, 1875-
1915, in 24 THE DRINKING & DRUG PRAC. SURVEYOR, June 1992, at 3-12).




From the first anti-drug law forbidding opium dens in San Francisco
in the late 1800s to anti-crack legislation in the 1980s, race has been the
driving force behind the movement to outlaw drugs. From opium to
heroin, powder cocaine, marijuana, and finally crack cocaine, there has
been a pattern of drug criminalization in America motivated by White
fear. Those fears were based on a belief that crazed drug addicts would
denigrate the White community, and the drug pushers, usually thought to
be people of color, would lead vulnerable Whites on a depraved road of
crime and prostitution.
In an earlier era, these concerns were voiced by the media and poh-
ticians in overtly racist appeals to Whites' fears. By the 1980s, however,
members of Congress and the media used "coded" messages to gain sup-
port for the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,' a criminal
sentencing scheme that created a 100:1 s disparity in the way crack and
powder cocaine are treated under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 6
4. "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986... set forth mandatory minimum sentences
for the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with intent to manufacture,
distribute or dispense, controlled substances." Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Comment, Federal
Sentencing Policy Following the 1995 Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness and Just Punishment, 21
HAMLiNE L. Rav. 347, 361 (1998). The Act created the framework of statutory sentences
that currently applies to federal drug offenses. See id. In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which "amended the controlled substance possession statute by
mandating a minimum five-year and maximum twenty-year imprisonment term for sim-
ple possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine." Id. at 363.
5. This 100:1 ratio however, does not mean that sentences are 100 times greater. As
Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996),
the Act "treat[s] one gram of crack as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine."
517 U.S. at 478. Justice Stevens continued:
The distribution of 50 grams of crack is thus punishable by the same
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison that applies to the
distribution of 5,000 grams of powder cocaine ... These penalties result
in sentences for crack offenders that average three-to-eight times longer
than sentences for comparable powder cocaine.
Id. at 478.
6. Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Sentencing
Commission") in 1984 to develop federal sentencing guidelines that would reduce incon-
sistencies in sentencing. See Grassley, supra note 4, at 354. "In April, 1987, the Sentencing
Commission adopted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's 100:1 ratio in the first official Guidelines
Manual." Id. at 363. Further, it is relevant that "[t]he Sentencing Commission did not
research or analyze the merits of the 100:1 ratio." Id. In 1995, "[i]n response to the Con-
gressional directive to analyze federal cocaine sentencing policy," the Sentencing
Commission issued its first report on the 100:1 ratio. Id. at 365. The report, entitled The
Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, found the disparity
was too great. See id. The Sentencing Commission "strongly" recommended eliminating
the 100:1 ratio. Id. at 369. On October 30, 1995, Congress rejected that proposal. See id.
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While the Civil Rights Movement and the changes brought on by
political correctness7  in the 1990s may have been successful in
"educating" Americans about race, it has also made it much more un-
popular to express racist sentiments. That does not mean the end of racism,
as some would suggest,8 but a movement to take racism underground.
at 370. In 1997, the Commission again urged the elimination of the 100:1 ratio, calling
instead for the adoption of a 5:1 ratio. See id. at 371-72.
President Clinton also indicated that he hoped to "bring the penalty for selling
powder cocaine closer to that of selling crack cocaine." DeWayne Wickham, Gore View
Falls Short on Cocaine Disparity, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1999, at 19A. However, he main-
tained, "You could make an argument for some disparity based on the level of violence
associated with crack trade." Id. Ultimately, the Senate failed to reduce the sentencing
disparity. See id. (explaining that the Senate failed to win the passage of a proposal de-
signed to cut the disparity to 10:1).
Meanwhile, in 1999, Vice President Al Gore, running to become the Democratic
presidential nominee, said: "I think the remaining disparities should be dealt with. I re-
spect the views of the law enforcement professionals who argue there is some
justification, but I don't see it myself." Id. (quoting Vice President Al Gore, Address at
the Trotter Group Annual Meeting at Clark Atlanta University).
7. For an excellent discussion of the fallacies of the claims of the anti-political cor-
rectness campaign, see Jamin B. Raskin, The Great PC Cover Up, CAL. LAW., Feb. 14,
1994, at 68. The author posits that political correctness "is never defined, because its po-
lemical power depends on mixing two different meanings: 'political correctness' (1) as
official compulsion and censorship and (2) as progressive ideas about race, gender and
power." Id. at 70. The author notes that "[b]y merging these meanings, the anti-PC party
identifies progressive ideas with censorship and dresses up its own political agenda in the
noble rhetoric of the First Amendment." Id. at 70. For example, the author criticizes the
anti-PC movement as confusing progressive calls for sensitization with state compulsion.
See id. at 70-72. He cites a Newsweek article on political correctness, which quoted a
conservative Stanford University student complaining that "[i]f I was at a lunch [in the
dorm] and we started talking about something like civil rights, I'd get up and leave .... I
knew they didn't want to hear what I had to say." Id. at 70.
While this article argues that the political correctness movement has educated soci-
ety about race, it is debatable whether this movement has been successful in actually
changing societal viewpoints. Rather than changing these viewpoints, the PC movement
has given rise to an anti-PC culture, which in essence is a "crusade ... against affirmative
action and the ideas associated with 'multiculturalism."' Id. at 72.
8. See DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RAcIsM (1995) (claiming that the lack of
progress in the Black community has more to do with a failure of African Americans to
take responsibility for their own renewal than with White racism). D'Souza explains:
In the black community, this cultural breakdown is characterized by the
following features: (1) a very heavy and perhaps excessive reliance on
government; (2) a sometimes virtual paranoia that racism is to blame for
all problems, including those that are quite personal; (3) hostility to aca-
demic achievement, which is very often, particularly in the inner city,
dismissed as a form of acting white; (4) a call to violence that has spread
and that threatens the integrity of our inner cities; and finally, perhaps
most tragically; (5) the normalization of illegitimacy in the inner city.
[VOL. 5:611
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Indeed, we have created an oxymoron-the sophisticated racist.9 These
sophisticated racists have learned to "code" their language and not to
leave behind "a paper trail"1 ° of racism, making it extremely difficult for
those who seek to challenge racist legislation as an Equal Protection vio-
lation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
This article proposes "de-coding" as a method for unveiling the rac-
ist purpose behind the enactment of race-neutral legislation. Through the
use of "code words," defined as "phrases and symbols which refer indi-
rectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic
or egalitarian ideals,"'" legislators can appeal to racist sentiments without
appearing racist. More importantly, they can do so without leaving evi-
dence that can be traced back as an intent to discriminate. This article
proposes to use "de-coding" as a method to unmask the racist purpose
behind the enactment of the 100:1 crack versus powder cocaine ratio for
mandatory federal prison sentences. However, while this article, like
many other law review articles on the subject,12 argues that the crack co-
caine sentencing scheme is unconstitutional, the real purpose of analyzing
the constitutionality of the crack statute is to show how "de-coding" can
be an effective means of unmasking the racist meaning behind primarily
race-neutral comments. When the interpretation of "de-coded," race-
neutral comments falls in line with an un-coded historical pattern of dis-
crimination, it makes sense to infer that there was an intent to
discriminate.
Dinesh D'Souza, Improving Culture to End Racism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785, 789-
90 (1996) (citations omitted).
9. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that "[t]he sophisticated would-be violator [of anti-discrimination laws] has made
our job a little more difficult").
10. "Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory
animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it." Id. (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831
F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987)).
11. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s 120 (1986).
12. See, e.g., David H. Angel, A 'Second Look' at Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policies:
One More Try for Federal Equal Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. PEv. 1211 (1997); Melissa C.
Brown, Equal Protection in a Mean World: Why Judge Cahill was Right in United States v.
Clary, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUBLIC POL'Y 307 (1997); Knoll D. Lowney,
Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 121 (1994); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational
Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Aaiz. L. REv. 1233 (1996); Laura A. Wytsma, Punishment for
'Just US"-A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEo. MA-
SON INDEP. L. REv. 473 (1995); Jason A. Gillmer, Note, United States v. Clary: Equal
Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 497 (1995); Grassley, supra note 4.
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While "de-coding" has some precedent, such as Justice Marshall's
dissent in Memphis v. Green3 and the Third Circuit decision in Aman v.
Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 4 too often courts fail to find the common-
sense meaning behind coded messages. "De-coding" as a judicial tool has
several benefits. First, as noted, there is some judicial precedent. Second,
it fits well within the framework of current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.' s Third, it appeals to common sense, something the Justices have
been increasingly urging the lower courts to use.
16
Part I will look at the district court decision in United States v.
Clary,1 7 which found the sentencing scheme unconstitutional, along with
the subsequent Eighth Circuit opinion reversing the lower court decision.
This article argues that while the district court's use of the "unconscious
racism" theory was logically sound--and a commendable effort to look at
racism in a contemporary context-it ultimately failed because such a
theory is a poor fit with the Supreme Court's narrow concept of racist
intent.
Part II will document the history of what is referred to in this paper
as "race coding"'8 in American politics. Specifically, this article traces how
coded racist messages have served White politicians well in appealing to
Whites' fears of crime and drugs, economic instability, a loss of "values"
and traditional notions of "equality." This history of coding political
messages of White supremacy, while at the same time washing one's
hands of all accusations of racism, is vital to understanding some of the
comments and actions taken during the crack cocaine debates. This sec-
tion will serve as a backdrop to the possible acceptance of "de-coding" as
a valid judicial tool and put the crack cocaine debate in historical per-
spective.
13. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
14. 85 F.3d 1074 (3d Cir. 1996).
15. In much of the Court's Equal Protection Clause doctrine, a violation requires a
showing that a decision-making body pass legislation with an intent to discriminate, i.e., it
must be shown that the decisionmakers "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of ac-
tion at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect on an
identifiable group." Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
16. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia stated, "[c]ommon sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish be-
tween simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or abu-
sive." Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
17. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
18. This article uses the term "race coding" to refer to the historic development that
has led to the use of racist code words and phrases, and uses the term "de-coding" to refer




Part III will demonstrate how this proposal is supported by Justice
Marshall's dissent in Greene and the Third Circuit's decision in Aman,
both of which looked to certain "code words" to find racist intent. Fi-
nally, Part IV shows how "de-coding" can be an effective tool to unveil
the racist intent behind the enactment of the crack cocaine sentencing
scheme. This article argues that "de-coding" further strengthens the ar-
gument that the passage of the Act was plagued with racism, and was
passed "because of," not merely "in spite of," the disparate impact the
legislation would have on Latinos and African Americans. '9
I. THE FAILURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
TO THE CRACK SENTENCING SCHEME
A. United States v. Clary: One Court's Use of 'Unconscious Racism'
to Show Racial Discrimination
In modem America, overt racism is not nearly as evident as it was
just a few decades ago. 20 The difficulty in rooting out racism is explained
by Jody Armour, who breaks down modem racists into two main cate-
gories: "hypocritical racists" and "aversive racists., 21 "Hypocritical
racists," he explains, are persons who may harbor racist feelings, but "fake
it" when confronted by others.22 On the other hand, "aversive racists" are
people who think of themselves as non-prejudiced but who "are not so
much deceiving others as fooling themselves." 23 In other words,
19. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
20. "The explicit rejection of equal opportunity and civil rights for people of color is
now virtually an absent political discourse except at the very fringes of national political
debate." AMY ELIZABETH ANSELL, NEW RIGHT, NEw RACISM: RACE AND REACTION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 58 (1997).
21. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 118 (1997).
22. Armour cites to controlled experiments on racial attitudes where participants
were monitored based on both their physiological and oral responses to questions of race.
See id. at 120. The "hypocritical racists" registered strong racist feelings on their "covert"
physiological monitor, but tailored their verbal responses to what they believed the ex-
perimenter wanted to hear. Id. at 126.
23. Id. Armour posits that "[t]he theory ofaversive racism[] begins with the proposi-
tion that most Americans are highly committed to egalitarian values .. . [maintaining] a
non-prejudiced self-image .... [But] deep down aversive racist[s] believe[] in White
superiority and do not want to associate with Blacks." Id. (citations omitted). For exam-
ple, aversive racists were given hypothetical fact patterns where Blacks and Whites were
in distress. See id. at 127. These aversive racists did not discriminate between Blacks and
Whites when they were asked hypothetical questions about whether to choose to help a
Black or White person where the solution to the problem called for a race-specific re-
sponse. See id. However, where there was ambiguity in how to solve a problem, aversive
SPRING 20001
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"hypocritical racists" purposely "code" their language, while "aversive
racists" use race-neutral justifications to mask their true racist beliefs. Un-
der either model, however, evidence of one's true racist belief or motive
will not be literally found in the words themselves. Instead, in the mud-
dled labyrinth of modem racism, myopic jurists need better judicial tools
to glean the racist meaning behind ostensibly race-neutral comments by
legislators seeking to pass legislation that adversely impacts people of
color.
In United States v. Clary, the only reported federal court decision
finding that the federal crack cocaine penalties violated the Equal Protec-
tion right found in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,4 the
racists chose to help Whites over Blacks by choosing race-neutral justifications, such as
relying upon a theoretical third party to help a Black person in distress, while rushing to
the aid of distressed Whites. See id. at 128.
24. This article argues the crack cocaine sentencing scheme violates the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the Fifth Amendment has no such express
clause, courts have ruled Equal Protection can be found in that amendment's Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that "racial segre-
gation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of
law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution").
Federal courts have already rejected numerous challenges to the crack sentencing
scheme on a variety of other grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95-
96 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim);
United States v. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a challenge
for vagueness because "cocaine base" can include cocaine derivatives and substances other
than crack cocaine); United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that had they been writing "from a clean slate," the Eighth Circuit may have
considered the 100:1 disparity a violation of due process, but instead the court felt bound
by precedent to reject such arguments); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897 (5th
Cir. 1992) (also bound by precedent to reject a due process argument); United States v.
Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1991) (expressing their approval of "those circuits
holding that the different penalties for cocaine base and cocaine in its other forms do not
violate due process").
Effective November 1, 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the sentencing
guidelines to note that "'Cocaine base,' for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack."'
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(c) (1993). "'Crack' is the street name for
a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium
bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." Id.
For a decision finding that the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, see State v. Russell,
477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991) (applying rational basis review). The court also noted
that strict scrutiny review could be applied to the state's sentencing scheme: "[M]inorities
can also be injured when the government is 'only' indifferent to their suffering or
'merely' blind to how prior official discrimination contributed to it and how current acts
will perpetuate it." Id. at 888 n.2 (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 16-21, 1518-19 (2d ed. 1988)).
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued its only opinion on the crack cocaine sentenc-
ing issue, in a limited ruling on prosecutorial discretion in bringing crack cocaine charges.
[VOL. 5:611
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district court used Charles Lawrence's "unconscious racism" theory" to
find the legislation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
26
ment. Drawing on Lawrence's theory, the court suggested that because
racism is irrational it is socially and politically unacceptable, and hence
racial prejudices will be repressed and relegated to the unconscious by the
ego. 7 Thus, the court posited that "benign neglect for the harmful impact
or fallout upon the black community that might ensue from decisions
made by the white community for the 'greater good' of society has re-
placed intentional discrimination., 28 With regard to the crack cocaine
sentencing scheme, this "benign neglect" for the harmful impact that
anti-drug laws would have on the Black community is based on many
Whites' perceptions of African Americans as "dangerous, different or
subordinate, [which] are lessons learned and internalized completely out-
side of our awareness, and are reinforced by the media-generated
In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-71 (1996), the Court held a class of
plaintiffs, who were charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute more
than 50 grams of crack cocaine, were not entitled to discovery based on a claim of race-
based selective prosecution. The defendants offered the district court finding based on
statistics from the Federal Defender Program in Los Angeles that indicated that of the 24
drug cases involving 50 or more grams of crack cocaine in 1991, all of the defendants
were Black. See id. at 459. In addition, the defendants offered an affidavit from a criminal
defense lawyer who indicated that in his experience many 'Whites were prosecuted in
state court (which has lower penalties) rather than federal court, as well as a newspaper
article that indicated that "crack criminals... are being punished far more severely than if
they had been caught with powder cocaine, and almost every single one of them is
black." Id. at 460-61. The district court granted the defendant's motion to compel the
government to provide statistics of the race of the defendants charged with crack cocaine
offenses, the state appealed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit panel reversed. See id. at
459-61. En banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, which the Su-
preme Court reversed, finding that "the defendant ... [must] produce some evidence
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not
.... "Id. at 469.
25. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Ray. 317, 330 (1987) (arguing that "[r]acism is in large part a
product of the unconscious").
26. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 796-97 (announcing the court's holding).
27. See id. at 780; Lawrence, supra note 25, at 332-35. Lawrence writes:
Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and unpro-
ductive, this hidden prejudice has become the more prevalent form of
racism. The individual's Ego must adapt to a cultural order that views
overtly racist attitudes and behavior as unsophisticated, uninformed, and
immoral. It must repress or disguise racist ideas when they seek expres-
sion.
Id. at 335.
28. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 779.
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stereotyping., 29 This "unconscious racism" infected the legislators' belief
that there was an epidemic regarding the spread of crack cocaine, and that
Black males were associated with that epidemic. 3
Turning to the Equal Protection analysis, the district court noted
that "a criminal defendant who alleges an Equal Protection violation must
prove that the 'invidious quality' of governmental action claimed to be
racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose.' "3 The court then used the factors set out in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation32 to find
circumstantial evidence of an intent to discriminate; in the case of sen-
tencing disparity, "unconscious racism" led to the failure of Congress to
see the foreseeable disparate impact on African Americans. Thus, the
district court focused on the failure of Congress to take into account the
disparate impact due to "unconscious racism," rather than looking to in-
tent per se to find an Equal Protection violation. While this may be a
useful and logical tool for analyzing racism in a contemporary context-
and the court should be commended for the attempt-its application to
the crack cocaine debates has failed because the reasoning is a difficult fit
in contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence.
29. Id. at 780-81 (citation omitted).
30. See id. at 780.
Given the racially segregated nature of American economic and social
life, the media has played an important role in the construction of a na-
tional image of Black male youth as 'the criminal' in two significant
respects, which served to enhance penalties for crack cocaine violators: 1)
generating public panic regarding crack cocaine; and 2) associating Black
males with crack cocaine. Ergo, the decision maker who is unaware of
this selection perception that has produced his stereotype will believe that
his actions are not motivated by racial prejudice.
Id.
31. Id. at 782 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
32. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Those factors include: (1) the adverse racial impact of the
official action; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision; (4) departures from normal procedure se-
quence; (5) substantive departure from routine decisions; (6) contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68. The
Supreme Court added a seventh factor to that inquiry-the inevitability or forseeability of
the consequence of the law. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
33. "Although intent per se may not have entered Congress' enactment of the crack
statute, its failure to account for a foreseeable disparate impact which would effect black
Americans in grossly disproportionate numbers would, nonetheless, violate the spirit and
letter of equal protection." Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 782.
[VOL. 5:611
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B. Evading Intent: Unconscious Racism A Poor Fit
with Supreme Court Jurisprudence
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected the lower court's use of
Charles Lawrence's "unconscious racism" theory because it does not fit
within the Supreme Court's narrow view of the intent required to prove
an Equal Protection violation. To find a legislative body acted with
"discriminatory purpose," the Eighth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's
requirement that "Congress selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action 'at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse ef-
fects upon an identifiable group.' ,34 The appellate court seemed to chide
the district court's attempt to evade the intent issue:
We first question the district court's reliance on 'uncon-
scious racism.' [citation omitted]. The court reasoned that a
focus on purposeful discrimination will not show more sub-
tle and deeply-buried forms of racism. [citation omitted].
The court's reasoning, however, simply does not address the
question whether Congress acted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. Similar failings affect the court's statement that
although intent per se may not have entered into Congress'
enactment of the crack statutes, Congress' failure to account
for a substantial and foreseeable disparate impact on African
Americans nonetheless violates the spirit and letter of equal
protection. 5
Thus, despite its merits as a theory, the use of an "unconscious
racism" analysis was easily dismissed by the Eighth Circuit because it did
not squarely address the issue of conscious, purposeful intent. An analysis
such as "de-coding", however, offers a modem method of proving
intent, but one that stays within the current Supreme Court's
requirement that the intent must have been conscious and purposeful.
"De-coding," unlike "unconscious racism," does not require a radical
34. United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)). For a
critique of the Supreme Court's narrow definition of intent, see Pamela S. Karlan, Dis-
criminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE LJ.
111 (1983). In her article, Karlan argues that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's special
concern for minorities ... requires that a legislature consider the rights of these groups
when it makes its 'calculus of effects.' A legislature should be charged with either actual or
constructive knowledge of potential burdens its acts will impose on minorities." Id. at 124
(citation omitted).
35. Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
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shift in jurisprudence and can be seen as a tool to interpret intent within
the current legal framework.
II. THE HISTORICAL USE Or RACIST "CODE WORDS"
IN AMERICAN POLITICS
A. George Wallace, The Father of "Race Coding"
An historical look at the phenomenon of "race coding" is essential
to understand how the use of code words operates in today's contempo-
rary socio-political culture. According to Michael Omi and Howard
Winant, the roots of "race coding" can be traced to 1968, when George
Wallace launched his bid to become president of the United States.-3 The
authors explained that former segregationists such as Wallace had to code
their formerly overtly racist words with subtly racist phrases and symbols
that still appealed to Whites' sense of justice and equal opportunity.
Wallace surprised political experts by expanding his appeal beyond the
Dixiecratsms in the South, managing to garner mass support in northern
blue-collar cities like Milwaukee, Detroit, and Philadelphia.3 9 As Omi and
36. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 11, at 121.
37.
[T]he racial upheavals of the 1960s precluded a direct return to this form
of racial logic. The new right objective, however, was to dismantle the
political gains of racial minorities. Since these gains could not be easily
reversed, they had to be re-articulated. The key device used by the new
right in its effort to limit the political gains of racial minority movements
has been 'code words.' These are phrases and symbols which refer indi-
rectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic
or egalitarian ideals (e.g. justice, equal opportunity). Beginning with the
Wallace campaign of 1968, we can trace the pattern of new right ex-
perimentation with these code words, and with the rearticulation of
racial meanings they attempt.
Id. at 120-21.
38. The Dixiecrat Party was formed in response to civil rights proposals endorsed by
President Harry Truman, a Democrat. See NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND AND
THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 129-31 (1993). Some segregationists believed that if
the Southern states, which held 127 electoral votes in the electoral college, could stick
together on states' rights, they could create a three-way split of the electoral college be-
tween Northern Democrats, Northern Republicans, and Dixiecrats. See id. at 133. They
believed this could lead to "[a] Northern deadlock," and therefore "the election of a
Southern president." Id.
39. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 11, at 121. The authors note that Wallace's entry
into the race was originally seen as a replay of the Dixiecrat strategy, which did not even
attempt to receive significant Northern support, and thus pundits were surprised by the
support he garnered in the North. See id.
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Winant noted, "[a]lthough Wallace's image as a racist politician originally
placed him in the national spotlight, it did not make good Presidential
politics, and he was forced to incorporate his racial message as a subtext,
implicit but 'coded,' in a populist appeal.
' '
40
The potential of coding racist language, used successfully in the Wal-
lace campaign, was noted by political analyst Kevin Phillips, who submitted
an analysis of United States voting trends to Nixon headquarters.) Pub-
lished the following year as The Emerging Republican Majority, "Phillips's
book suggested a turn to the right and the use of 'coded' anti-black cam-
paign rhetoric (e.g., law and order). 2 Wallace's success convinced Phillips
that a "southern strategy"" could shift well-entrenched political align-
ments.5 Phillips believed that Republicans, deeply unpopular in the
South since the Civil War, could garner support by appealing to White
Southern racists. 6 A New Right coalition emerged in the mid-1970s
with a populist style that united previously distinct strands of the right
wing by promoting a common agenda of "anti-communism militarism,
moral orthodoxy and free market capitalism-themes that would eventu-
ally deliver Reagan to the White House.,
47
40. Id. at 121. Consequently:
Wallace thus struck certain chords that anticipated the new right
agenda-defense of traditional values, opposition to 'big government'
and patriotic and militaristic themes. But the centerpiece of his appeal
was his racial politics. Wallace was a law-and-order candidate, an anti-
statist, an inheritor of classical southern populist traditions.
Id.
41. See id.
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Wallace "won the South and almost 14 percent of the total vote." ANSELL, supra
note 20, at 76.
44. Phillips' argument was that racist campaign rhetoric could win the conservative




[Tlhe white middle-class influx is making the urban South generally less
Negro while the urban North becomes more heavily Negro. For these
reasons, Negroes are not likely to exercise a very great direct influence
on Southern presidential voting. And where they are most numerous-
Mississippi, for example-whites tend to be most firmly united against
them.
Id. at 289.
47. ANSELL, supra note 20, at 77.
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B. The Reagan Revolution: The Formation of "Colorblind Slurs"
Building on the emergence of "race coding" that emerged in the
1970s, the "New Right" or "neoconservatives" couched racial themes in
notions of law-and-order and individual rights.48 The early 1980s wit-
nessed the ascension of Ronald Reagan, a fierce opponent of civil rights
legislation who told Mississippians on the 1980 campaign trail that he fa-
vored "state's rights," and defended his wife's remark that she wished her
husband could be in New Hampshire to "see all these beautiful white
people., 49 Still, he appeared in numerous photo opportunities with Afri-
can Americans to show that he, in fact, was not a racist.50 Quoting
political scientist Merle Black, Omi and Winant noted Reagan's appeal to
young White conservatives:
Reagan's kind of civilized the racial issue. He's taken what
Wallace never could do and made it acceptable. It fits in
with their [white students'] sense of perceived injustice,
with what they see as the status of being a white person not
being as high was it was 15, 20 or 30 years ago.5 1
Writing in 1986, the authors concluded on the status of racial politics:
"Racial reaction has attained maturity and power, operating behind a
subtle and seductive veneer of opposition to 'race thinking.' 52
In the 1980s, words like "fairness," "welfare," and "groups" took on
racial meanings in a backlash to the liberal policies of the 1960s, accord-
ing to Thomas and Mary Edsall. 3 They broke down some of this coded
language:
48.
[T]he radical democratic demands (of "equality of result") typified by af-
firmative action particularly threatened certain vulnerable groups.
Unionized workers benefiting from de facto segregated seniority systems,
for example, or white ethnic residents of urban enclaves who felt them-
selves to be an "endangered species"-hemmed in by ghettos or barrios,
fearful of crime-became potential conservative constituencies.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 11, at 130.
49. Id. at 131-32 (citation omitted).
50. See id. at 134.
51. Id. at 135 (citing Haynes Johnson Race, Despite Progress, South Sees this Election in
Black and White, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1984).
52. Id.
53. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 213 (1991).
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New forces gave new meaning to the coded language of
politics. 'Fairness,' championed by [1984 Democratic presi-
dential nominee Walter] Mondale and stressed in the
Democratic platform, no longer symbolized to achieve tax
equity for 'average' working men and women, to provide
access to middle-class homes and incomes, or to insure the
right to bargain with management for just compensation;
'fairness' now meant, to many voters, federal action to tilt
the playing field in favor of minorities, government unions,
feminists, criminal defendants, the long-term jobless, never-
wed mothers, drug addicts, and gays.54
These appeals, taken in context and loaded with significance, be-
come what this article refers to as colorblind slurs-race-neutral entreaties
to Whites' stereotypes and racist prejudices. For example, neo-
conservatives ostensibly could be talking about every woman who lives
on the dole when they deride "welfare queens."-" However, depending
on the context in which this phrase is used and considering the historical
significance of attaching welfare to race, it does not take a leap of logic to
see this term for what it is-a colorblind slur referring to Black, lazy
women who drain the tax rolls by having too many babies.5 6
Edsall and Edsall give a number of examples of what I refer to as
colorblind slurs. For example, the authors opined that the word "group,"
in Republican rhetoric, became "claimants for special preference," and
"taxes" had come to be seen as "the resource financing a liberal federal
judiciary, granting expanded rights to criminal defendants, to convicted
felons, and, in education and employment, to 'less qualified' minorities.-
7
54. Id. at 214.
55. This term came into popular use in Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign
speeches, in which he told the story of a Cadillac-driving Chicago "welfare queen" who
was collecting dozens of welfare checks under different names. See Robert Friedman,
Sorry, We Have No Time For Apologies Series: Popular Culture, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, June
26, 1988, at Perspective.
56.
It is the image of the 'lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the ex-
pense of the taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare
check' that is used to sell programs to the public that will adversely affect
women. The message is that black women are immoral, unfeminine, un-
desirable and that white women should not be like them.
Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
345, 369-70 (1996) (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of
Motherhood, 1 Am. U.J. GENDER & L. 25 (1993)).
57. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 53, at 214.
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In 1988, the word "crime" took on a new, coded meaning, with the
emergence of the Willie Horton presidential campaign issue.
C. Willie Horton: The Black Male Symbol of Crime
The 1988 presidential campaign witnessed the exploitation of crime
and race in the form of one black man-William (Willie) Horton, a con-
victed killer who raped a White woman and stabbed her fianc6 while on
furlough from a Massachusetts prison. The George Bush presidential team
utilized the Willie Horton issue, highlighted in speeches and a national ad
campaign, ss to appeal to Whites' fears of Black male criminals supposedly
coddled by his opponent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. 9
The Bush campaign used Willie Horton to symbolize Michael Dukakis'
"soft on crime" attitude, and symbolized the threat of Black males. 6 In
611984, the Reagan-Bush campaign exploited race as an election issue.
58. See Maralee Schwartz & Lloyd Grove, TV Ads to Depict Gov. Dukakis as Coddling
Criminals, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1988, at A14. The ad, which first ran in September 1992,
featured a black screen with the words: "A Crime Quiz." See Sidney Blumenthal, Willie
Horton & The Making of an Election Issue; How the Furlough Factor Became a Stratagem of the
Bush Forces, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1988, at Dl. Then the announcer asks, "[w]hich can-
didate for president gave weekend passes to first-degree murderers who are not even
eligible for parole?" Id. "On one side was a picture of a smiling Bush, bathed in a golden
sunny glow. On the other was a picture of a disheveled, double-chinned swarthy Du-
kakis. His picture came forward in answer to the question." Id. Finally, the announcer
asks, "'Which candidate can you really trust to be tough on crime?' Bush's picture came
forward." Id.
59. See D. Marvin Jones, "We're All Stuck Here for a While": Law and the Social Con-
struction of the Black Male, 24 J. CoNTEmp. L. 35, 58 n.54 (1998); see also Schwartz &
Grove, supra note 58, at A14 (quoting Floyd Brown, a political consultant for Americans
for Bush: "When we're through, people are going to think that Willie Horton is Michael
Dukakis' nephew"). For the record, it was Al Gore, a rival of Dukakis for the 1988
Democratic nomination, who first exploited the Willie Horton issue by asking Dukakis
during a debate about "weekend passes for convicted criminals." Blumenthal, supra note
58, at Dl.
60. Jesse Jackson said the Willie Horton issue was "'designed to create the most hor-
rible psychosexual fears .... '" Id. Bush campaign manager, Lee Atwater, of course
claimed "'race ... has nothing to do with this issue. I would condemn in any way, shape
or form the issue used in this way.'" Id.
61. Atwater once wrote that the Reagan-Bush teams openly courted the "'hard-core
segregationists"' of the South in 1984 in an attempt to win the votes of Southern
"'populists.'" EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 53, at 221.
As for race, it was hardly an issue-it went without saying that the popu-
lists' chosen leaders were hard-core segregationists ... When social and
cultural issues died down, the populists were left with no compelling
reason to vote Republican . . . When Republicans are successful in get-
ting certain social issues to the forefront, the populist vote is ours.
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Now, in 1988, Willie Horton was the perfect symbol to appeal to
Whites' fear of the Black male criminal. Edsall and Edsall quote Bush
campaign manager Lee Atwater:
I can't wait until this Dukakis fellow gets down here [the
South] .... There is a story about a fellow named Willie
Horton who for all I know may end up to be Dukakis'
running mate. Dukakis is making Hamlet look like the rock
of Gibraltar in the way he's acted on [selecting a running
mate.] The guy [Dukakis] was on TV about a month ago
and he said you'll never see me standing in the driveway of
my house talking to these [prospective vice presidential
running mates]. And guess what, on Monday, I saw in the
driveway of his house? Jesse Jackson. So anyway, maybe
he'll put this Willie Horton guy on the ticket after all is said
and done.6 2
The message Atwater conveyed was that Jesse Jackson is the same as
Willie Horton, and putting Jesse Jackson on the ticket as vice president
was essentially the same as putting Willie Horton himself on the ticket. 
63
Black male equals criminal,64 and this association between crime and
Id. (quoting The South In 1984, Atwater's unpublished analysis of Southern politics for the
Reagan-Bush campaign).
62. Id. at 223.
63. "[Tlhe myth of the black male as archetypical criminal, as Willie Horton, is com-
pressed rhetorically so tightly with observations that they merge into one." Jones, supra
note 59, at 82.
64. "Crime became a shorthand signal, to crucial numbers of white voters, of broader
issues of social disorder, tapping powerful ideas about authority, status, morality, self-
control, and race." EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 53, at 224. For another expression of
this sentiment, see Richard Cohen, Campaign Codes for Race, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1988,
at A25, noting:
Alexis de Tocqueville, should he peer down at the 1988 campaign,
would not be surprised at some of the issues raised. More than a century
ago, the French traveler in the United States wrote that race would re-
main an abiding American issue. The only thing that might confuse
Tocqueville is the absence of the word itself. Once he learned the code
words, though, he would feel very much at home.
The first of these is "crime." Of course, whites commit crime, but the
crime most white Americans fear is black crime. In that regard, George
Bush has been given the gift of Willie Horton, the furloughed Massa-
chusetts killer who escaped and raped a woman in Maryland. Furloughs
are a routine fixture of the American penal system, but it was Dukakis'
bad luck that his wayward prisoner happened to be black. Had Horton
been white, it is safe to say the furlough issue would have lost some of its
punch.
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African American and Latino males65 is an important subtext underlying
modem political discourse about crime. 66 The words "criminal," "drug
pusher," and "drug dealer" become colorblind slurs or code words for
young African American or Latino males who threaten the sanctity of
White neighborhoods. 67 The racial meaning behind those words becomes
more apparent when used in conjunction with depictions of these
"criminals," "drug dealers," and "drug pushers" working the "dark,
stinking alleys" and "garbage-strewn streets" of the "inner city" of black
and brown America,"' as was the case during the crack cocaine debates. 69
These code words are especially effective in exploiting Whites' fears of
young, Black males.
D. White Fear, A Coded Call to Arms
In the 1980s, Whites' fear of crime, largely associated with Black
men, resulted in "white flight" from the inner cities to the suburbs. 70
Commented Democratic Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri:
When you get underneath all the layers of code words, the
emerging definition of where working class Democrats fit is
they talk about themselves as 'the people who work.' Peo-
ple who don't work, that describes [their perception] of the
black-white problem in our society right now .... Crime
65. While Black males have been most prominently, and unabashedly, exploited as
symbols of crime, young male Latinos similarly face such stereotyping, especially in the
context of drugs, which are heavily imported from Latin American countries.
66. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 53, at 224.
67. See id. See also infra notes 246-51 (discussing racist depictions of African Ameri-
cans as criminals).
68. Alexander Polikoff, Comments on Alex M. Johnson, Jr.'s Destabilizing Race, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 1685, 1691 (1995) (discussing the racism implicit in the term "inner city,"
based upon the observation that, "the American ghetto is predominantly a black ghetto").
69. See Heflin Debate, supra note 3, at S26,458.
70. See Polikoff, supra note 68, at 1692 ("[Iln 1990, about 11 million people lived in
all metropolitan area ghetto tracts, nearly 6 million of whom were blacks (a 36% increase,
by the way, since 1980).").
Johnson posits that "white flight" is a modem form of segregation:
Although causally linked to racism, the outward flight of whites to sub-
urbia-leaving as one songwriter described, a 'chocolate city' surrounded
by 'vanilla suburbs'-is clearly a factor in maintaining residential segrega-
tion patterns in an era in which overt racism has diminished and lost
flavor.
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race
as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. Rav. 1595, 1611 (1995).
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and drugs, and a sense of the mobility of crime right now,
that it doesn't stay in that neighborhood over there, that it's
a real threat to me and my children, that's added a real di-
mension to black-white relations.
7 1
Thus, as Representative Gephardt noted, for Whites, crime is a
threat only when it spreads from the Black and brown neighborhoods to
White ones. This theme was rampant in the crack cocaine debates.72 The
media and members of Congress repeatedly declared to the American
public that crack cocaine was seeping from the inner city into the suburbsand rral •73
and rural America. The politicians during the crack cocaine debates did
not need to overtly appeal to Whites' racist fears of Black males to get
their attention; by the 19 80s, many Whites believed that Black men had
the power to destroy the sanctity of White neighborhoods and suburbs.74
Sociologists suggest white fear is the result of an increasing disconnection
between the problems of the inner city and life in the suburbs, and an
increasing disconnection along racial lines. 7 This disconnection made it
71. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 53, at 226.
72. See, e.g., infra notes 225-44 and accompanying text (discussing how members of
Congress used coded language to send the message that the White community needs to
be protected from Black and Latino drug pushers.).
73. See Heflin Debate, supra note 3, at S26,458 (Senator Heflin notes that "this war
was once fought only in urban America, but increasingly, there are daily skirmishes on
country roads, on remote rural routes, and in tree-lined streets of small towns and vil-
lages.").
74. For example, Edsall and Edsall spoke with Peggy Angelair, the president of Peo-
ple Against Crime, which was formed in 1988 by White residents of Chicago's Garfield
Ridge neighborhood angered by reports of three rapes and increasing incidents of robbery
and vandalism. "I guess our federal government decided it was going to take the minori-
ties and put them with us, and our goodness would rub off on them. But unfortunately,
it's turned around the other way. And we have to stay together on this issue." EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 53, at 237.
75. Edsall and Edsall write:
It has been in the nature of the contact of whites with the black under-
class that this contact has routinely violated every standard necessary for
the breakdown of racial stereotypes. Most white contact with the under-
class is either through personal experience of crime and urban squalor,
... or through the almost daily reports about crime, drugs, and violence
on local and national television news and in newspapers .... It is pre-
cisely the degree to which such media coverage not only amplifies bad
news, but in fact accurately reflects a situation that exists across the
country, that these reports create such a damaging impact: 'The stereo-
type is not a stereotype any more. The behavior pattern [in the
underclass] is not stereotypical in the pejorative sense, but it is a statement
of fact,' says Kenneth S. Tollett, a black professor of education at How-
ard University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
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all the easier for Whites to believe the incendiary rhetoric of their White
legislators, who got their information from the panic-stricken media,S • 76
which resorted to shameless hyperbole in describing the situation. This
disconnection also made it easier for members of Congress to appeal to
Whites' fears in code, which was by this time a highly developed method
of political discourse. Yet, in the 1990s, coded racism became even more
veiled and amorphous in the debate over "family values."
E. The 1990s-Race as a "Value"
In 1992, "family values" became a central theme of the presidential
race between Bill Clinton and George Bush, with Vice President Dan
Quayle criticizing the fictional TV character "Murphy Brown" for hav-
ing a child out of wedlock.7 But when you are talking about something
as nebulous as a "family value," the door gets flung wide open for race-
baiters to appeal to white America's sense of decline in white power.7 8 In
1992, in through that door walked Pat Buchanan, the conservative politi-
cian and former press aide to Ronald Reagan. There was some question
as to whether Buchanan's views on gays, blacks, Jews and immigrants
were comparable to those of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke,
whose positions on certain foreign and domestic policies were praised by
Buchanan during his run for the Republican nomination.79 During his
campaign, Buchanan said he was committed to "equal justice under law"
Id. at 236.
76. See, e.g., infra notes 174-75 (discussing media portrayals of the crack "epidemic")
77. See John E. Yang & Ann Devroy, Quayle: "Hollywood Doesn't Get It," Admini-
stration Struggles to Explain Attack on TV's Murphy Brown, WASH. POST, May 21, 1992, at
Al.
78. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 56, at 352. Perry writes:
Racism is implicated in a number of ways in the family values debate.
Although the phrase 'family values' is often used to decry an alleged loss
of values in society generally, the phrase also has a lurking racial subtext.
The term 'family values,' linked as it often is with welfare and single
motherhood, easily becomes a code word for race just as 'welfare de-
pendency,' 'inner city,' and the 'urban underclass,' have.
Id. See also Thomas B. Edsall, The "Values" Debate: Us vs. Them? At Issue is Which Party
Best Represents Heavily White Middle Class, WASH. POST, July 31, 1992, at A8 (discussing
the not-very-subtle struggle between Bill Clinton and George Bush over who better
represents middle-class--and heavily White-America that lies beneath the debate over
what political strategists call 'values' questions).
79. See EJ. Dionne Jr., Is Buchanan Courting Bias? Equivocations on Duke Pose Questions
About Attitude, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1992, at Al.
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and opposed to "reverse discrimination," terms that appealed to Whites'
sense that their rights were being eroded by minority encroachment."s
For example, in Ellijay, Georgia, Buchanan told an almost all-White
crowd of'about one thousand that his home town, Washington, D.C.,
was a nice southern town "before all that crowd came rolling in and took
over."' The Washington Post reported that he never specified who "all
that crowd" was, but that he had given an interview about his wife
walking down Connecticut Avenue, "and these guys were sitting on the
corner playing bongo drums. I mean, this is the town I grew up in.
'8 2
This is the same fighter for "equal justice" who remarked on This Week
with David Brinkley that the United States should favor White Europeans
over Zulus and other ethnic groups because Europeans are easier to as-
similate.8 3 Still, Buchanan insisted he was not a racist, even though he
stood behind ex-Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard and Louisiana politician
David Duke, writing in an October 1991 newspaper column: "The na-
tional press calls these positions [on welfare, affirmative action and foreign
aid] 'code words' for racism, but in hard times in Louisiana, Duke's mes-




George Bush ultimately won his party's nomination, but he allowed
Buchanan to be his attack dog to court members of the Right. In his in-
cendiary speech at the Republican National Convention in August 1992,
Pat Buchanan declared that there was a "cultural war" in America being
waged by supporters of affirmative action, gay rights, legalized abortion,
851immigration, and feminism. He ended the speech with an anecdote
about the Los Angeles riots: Buchanan described a group from the Eight-
eenth Cavalry National Guard sweeping into the city, "M-16s at the
ready," representing "force, rooted in justice, backed by moral cour-
age. '" He told the Convention of the "19-year-old boys ready to lay





84. Id. See also Thomas Edsall, Republicans Launch Attack on Buchanan; WWII Com-
ments Draw Heavy Fire, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al (detailing various sexist, anti-
Semitic and racist comments made by Buchanan in his career as a journalist and politi-
cian). Buchanan once wrote, "David Duke is busy stealing from me. I have a mind to go
down there and sue that dude for intellectual property theft." Id. (quoting the Manchester
(N.H.) Union Leader, Dec. 15, 1991).
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even know."87 In an emotional call to arms, he concluded: "As these boys
took back the streets of Los Angeles, block by block, so we must take
back our cities, and take back our culture, and take back our country.,,a
In other words, Pat Buchanan played on Whites' fears of non-European
immigration, inner-city crime, and cultural diversity. Buchanan fueled
those fears by glorifying an era when Whites reigned supreme and non-
White, non-Christian culture was considered depraved. 9
Not to lose the entire "value" debate to the Republicans, Bill Clin-
ton exploited an obscure remark by a Black female rap artist to
demonstrate to Whites his willingness to stand up against African Ameri-
can interests.90 In a speech before the NAACP, attended by the Reverend
Jesse Jackson, then-Governor Clinton chastised the NAACP for giving
the rap artist Sister Souljah a forum for her views on race. 91 Clinton criti-
87. Id.
88. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that the manager of a Los Angeles retire-
ment home told the Associated Press the next day that 70 elderly residents were forced to
defend themselves after their initial calls to the Eighteenth Cavalry went unheeded. See
Maralee Schwartz et al., Buchanan's Riot Story of Bravery Disputed, WASH. PosT, Aug. 19,
1992, at Al.
89. Pat Buchanan bluntly states in a 1983 newspaper column: "our civilization [is]
superior to the others. And our culture is superior to other cultures ... because our re-
ligion is Christianity, and that is the truth that makes men free." Edsall, supra note 84. Pat
Buchanan continues to draw fire for his remarks in his run for the Reform Party presi-
dential nomination, arguing in his latest book, A Republic, Not an Empire, that Adolf
Hider was not a threat to American interests. See id. Comments like this take on added
meaning, considering Buchanan's past views on Hitler. For example, Buchanan once told
members of the Christian Coalition:
Though Hitler was indeed racist and anti-Semitic to the core ... he was
also an individual of great courage ... His genius was an intuitive sense
of the mushiness, the character flaws, the weakness masquerading as mo-
rality, that was in the hearts of the statesman who stood in his path.
Id.
90. "[S]ome suggest that when Bill Clinton chided rapper Sister Souljah for her vio-
lent lyrics during his presidential campaign, his ulterior motive was to distance himself
from African Americans." Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Ob-
servations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 1, 50 n.193
(1994) (quoting Toni Morrison, On the Backs of Blacks, TIME, Fall 1993, at 57 (stating that
"it is a mistake to think that Bush's Willie Horton or Clinton's Sister Souljah was any-
thing but a candidate's obligatory response to the demands of a contentious electorate
unable to understand itself in terms other than race")). See also Dorothy Gilliam, Clinton's
Low Blow to Black Aspirations, WASH. POST, June 17, 1992, at C1 ("What made this ex-
ploitation so insulting, maddening even, is the belief of many blacks that Clinton would
not have treated a white constituency in so cavalier a manner. He seemed like yet another
white man slapping down an 'uppity' black man.").
91. See Thomas B. Edsall, Clinton Stuns Rainbow Coalition; Candidate Criticizes Rap
Singer's Message, WASH. PosT, June 14, 1992, at Al.
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cized Souljah for telling The Washington Post, "[i]f black people kill black
people every day, why not have a week and kill white people?, 92 Clinton
told the shocked NAACP audience: "[i]f you took the words 'white' and
'black' and reversed them, you might think David Duke was giving that
speech., 93 Jackson, meanwhile, said the speech was "purely to appeal to
conservative whites by containing [him] and isolating [him]. '  By the
close of the century, it has become even more apparent that racism is al-
most always expressed in oblique code.
F. The fig is Up: White Supremacists Admit To Coding
In 1998, Representative Bob Barr, the Republican from Georgia
who called for President Clinton's impeachment before anyone had ever
heard of Monica Lewinsky, was "outed" as a White supremacist by Har-
vard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, who took offense to Barr's
reference to "real Americans" in hearings on Clinton's impeachment. 9
Feeling the remark was anti-Semitic, Dershowitz retorted that Barr was a
supporter of a White supremacist group, the Council of Conservative
Citizens ("CCC").9 Soon thereafter, it was revealed that Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott, Republican of Mississippi, also was a member and had
spoken to members of the organization. 97 Lott and Barr attempted to dis-
tance themselves from the organization, with Lott initially claiming he
had "no first hand knowledge of the group's views." 8 However, Arnie
Watson, Lott's "favorite uncle" and CCC board member, told the New
York Times that Lott was an "honorary member." 99 Confronted with
growing evidence that he knew of the group's views, including pictures
showing him posing with the group's leaders, Lott then declared that the
group's use of his name to publicize its views was "wrong. ' ° An exami-
nation of the positions of this group, which also had close ties to
Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice and South Carolina Senator Jesse
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Dan Balz, Clinton Says Jackson is Rewriting History; Candidate Reacts to Remarks in
Controversy Concerning Rap Singer Sister Souljah, WASH. POST, June 20, 1992, at All.
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Helms,01 is valuable in understanding how modem White supremacists
have transformed their racist rhetoric.
The CCC has a range of causes, "including opposition to unfettered
immigration and school busing for desegregation" and to interracial mar-
riage, as well as the promotion of "Southern cultural issues., 10 2 The group
was formed using the membership lists of the old White Citizens' Coun-
cils, described by a Southern Poverty Law Center spokesperson as "the
white-collar Ku Klux Klan" that, among other efforts, raised money for
the legal defense of Byron De La Beckwith, convicted in 1994 of the
1963 murder of civil rights leader Medgar Evers. 0 3 The group's newspa-
per, the Citizens Informer, is loaded with racist articles, including one by
Robert B. Patterson, a founder of a White Citizens' Council, which
opined that "no one can question the importance of miscegenation ....
[A]ny effort to destroy the [White] race by a mixture of black blood is an
effort to destroy Western civilization. '"' ° The CCC is the same group to
which Lott once spoke, telling them they were a "needed" group to
"help protect our flag, Constitution and other symbols of freedom" from
"dark forces."' '° Of course, Lott would deny vehemently that these were
code words for racism. Luckily, Mr. Lott's old pal Gordon Lee Baum, the
chief executive officer of the CCC, gave an interview to The Washington
Post in which he translated the group's tenets.
In the interview with the Post shortly after this controversy surfaced,
Baum explicated his views on inter-racial marriage, immigration, crime
and a loss of "white culture."' When asked about Patterson's condem-
nation of miscegenation, Baum, the neo-racist, offered the segregationist
stalwart some linguistic help: "I tried to explain to Bob that miscegena-
tion is 1950s talk, it just doesn't work in our new context. He felt real
bad, too. He's an old war horse. 10 7 Instead, Baum explained how a
proper, modem racist should speak, prompting the reporter to write that




104. Michael Powell, White Wash-Suddenly, Gordon Baum, Small-Time Race Baiter, Is





108. Id. For example, Baum pointed to another column written by a CCC member as
a fine example of the newspeak of race mixing. This author wrote:
Take 10 bottles of milk to represent all humans on earth. Nine of them
will be chocolate and only one white. Now mix all those bottles together
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George Wallace's refurbished populist ideology, Baum explained how to
appeal to racists in acceptable language: "[y]ou've got to talk crime, talk
quotas, talk immigration. You've got to put it down where the chickens
can get at it. "'09 Baum told the Post he is not a racist, but instead merely
concerned with a breadth of conservative issues."O
The most frustrating feature of code words is the difficulty some
Whites have in recognizing them. Law Professors Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefanic explain that people of color discern meanings in such words
that Whites generally miss:
Racism's victims become sensitized to its subtle nuances and
code-words-the body language, averted gazes, exasperated
looks, terms such as 'you people,' 'innocent whites,' 'highly
educated black,' 'articulate' and so on that, whether in-
tended or not, convey racially charged meanings. Like an
Aleut accustomed to reading the sky for signs of snow or a
small household pet skilled at recognizing a clumsy football,
racism's perpetual victims are alert to the various guises ra-
cism and racial signaling take. Sympathizers of majority hue
often must labor to acquire the knowledge that for minori-
ties comes all too easily."
Even Randall Kennedy, a proponent of the "color blind" approach
to law, recognizes that Whites find it difficult to detect subtle forms of
racism when he refers to "the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt
unobtrusively to new surroundings and, further, to hide itself even from
those firmly within its grips."1 2 Thus, it took America's first Justice of
color, Thurgood Marshall, to first recognize "coded" racism in a legal
opinion.
and you have gotten rid of that troublesome bottle of white milk. There
too is the way to get rid of the world of whites ... genocide via the
bedroom chamber.
Id. Baum, who admitted that in the past the group had drawn criticism for being "too
dang candid," said of this article: "[nlow I can live with that." Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. Baum's denial that he is a racist adds credence to the view that racism will
always be denied and explained away. After all, if a hard-core White supremacist claims
he is not a racist, then who will?
111. Richard Delgado & Jean Stephanic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Social Ills?, 77 CORNEIL L. REv. 1258, 1283 (1992).
112. Randall Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1419 (1988).
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III. "DE-CODING" GETS RECOGNIZED IN LAW
A. Memphis v. Greene:Justice Marshall First De-Codes Racism
Justice Thurgood Marshall was the first Supreme Court Justice to
"de-code" race-neutral comments to reveal their true racist intent in his
dissent in Memphis v. Greene.13 In Greene, the City of Memphis decided
to close the north end of a street that connected a White neighborhood
with a Black one in order to reduce the flow of "undesirable traffic" in
order to promote the safety of children. 4 It also sold a twenty-five foot
wide strip of the street to two adjacent White property owners, declaring
in a city council resolution that the strip was "closed to the public."".
Closing the thoroughfare impeded Black citizens' access to a public park
and zoo that had been segregated until 1963, and both inconvenienced
Black home owners and reduced their property values." 6 The majority
found that these comments were not evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion because they were race neutral." 7 The court declared, "[t]he
inconvenience of the drivers is a function of where they regularly drive-
not a function of their race."'18 Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, characterized the action differently:
The case is easier than the majority makes it appear. Peti-
tioner city of Memphis, acting at the behest of white
property owners, has closed the main thoroughfare between
an all-white enclave and a predominantly Negro area of the
city. The stated explanation for the closing is of a sort all
too familiar: 'protecting the safety and tranquility of a resi-
dential neighborhood' by preventing 'undesirable traffic'
from entering it. Too often in our Nation's history, state-
ments such as these have been little more than code phrases
for racial discrimination, but apparently not, after today's
decision, forbidden discrimination." 9
Significantly, Justice Marshall did not examine the city's stated aims
in a vacuum. He instead looked at those comments in the context of "our
113. 451 U.S. at 135 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 102-05; see also id. at 136 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 112-13 nn.19, 21.
116. See id. at 103, 116 n.27.
117. See id. at 128.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Nation's history. ' ' ' 2 Justice Marshall found "highly relevant" a contem-
porary statement that the action was taken to keep out "undesirable
traffic."'' 2  Because the majority found that this term did not have any
particular racial significance, Justice Marshall "de-coded" the comment:
The term 'undesirable traffic' first entered this litigation
through the trial testimony of Sarah Terry. Terry, a West
Drive resident who opposed the closing, testified that she
was urged to support the barrier by an individual who ex-
plained to her that 'the traffic on the street was undesirable
traffic.' The majority apparently reads the term 'undesirable'
as referring to the prospect of having any traffic at all on
West Drive. But the common-sense understanding of Terry's
testimony must be that the word 'undesirable' was meant to
describe the traffic that was actually using the street, as op-
posed to any traffic that might use it. Of course, the traffic
that was both actually using the street and would be affected
by the barrier was predominantly Negro.
122
In other words, while the majority strained to find a race-neutral
justification for the term "undesirable traffic," Justice Marshall used
"common sense," in the context of "our Nation's history, 12 3 and called
the term what it was-a colorblind slur referring to the undesirability of
allowing Blacks into a White neighborhood. 2 4 In fact, Justice Marshall's
120. Id. at 136. Justice Marshall placed the race-neutral comments in their proper
historical context. This approach is supported by Court pronouncements that the eviden-
tiary inquiry involving discriminatory intent must necessarily vary depending on the
factual context. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (discussing racially discriminatory practices in property rezoning
plans); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (discussing the absence of
discriminatory intent with respect to a police department's written personnel tests).
121. Greene, 451 U.S. at 141-42 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
123. Cf. supra note 16 (writing for a unanimous court, Scalia stated that "common
sense, and an appropriate amount of sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and
juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same
sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely
hostile or abusive").
124. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens, who today is considered
one of the more liberal members of the Court. Oftentimes people of color will be much
more attentive to racist code words, while even liberal Whites choose not to detect them.
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic explain:
Choosing to believe in a race-free world reduces guilt and the need for
corrective action. Racism is often a matter of interpretation; when an
interpretation renders one uncomfortable and the other does not, which
will a person often make?
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use of "de-coding" is consistent with decisions subsequent to Greene,
where the Court in effect used "de-coding" when faced with challenges
from White plaintiffs.2 5 This stands in contrast to the Court's blind igno-
rance to blatant discrimination against African Americans in Greene,
where the city of Memphis used race-neutral diction to engage in a prac-
tice with a disparate impact on minorities. 126
B. "Code Word" Analysis Validated in the Employment Context
While the Supreme Court has not utilized Justice Marshall's "de-
coding" as a tool to find discriminatory intent against people of color, the
Third Circuit has recognized the use of racist "code words" used in the
employment discrimination context. In its decision in Aman v. Cort Fur-
niture Rental Corporation,12 7 the Third Circuit held that the use of racist
"code words" can be proof of discriminatory intent.128 Aman, an em-
Delgado & Stefanic, supra note 111, at 1283 (citing Darryl Brown, Racism and Relations in
the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295 (1990)).
125. See David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race, 45 Am. U. L. REV.
729, 731-36 (1996). For example, in an affirmative action case, the Court declared its
duty to "smoke out" racism. Id. at 734 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). In a voting rights decision, the Court called the shape of a major-
ity-Black district "bizarre" and "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Id. at 736
(citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993)).
Conversely, the Court set the bar extremely high for the African Americans who
complained they were being selectively prosecuted for federal crack offenses because of
their race. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), discussed supra note 24
and accompanying text. Unlike in Shaw, the Court refused to infer racism from cold
statistics, and even "reserve[d] the question whether a defendant must satisfy the similarly
situated requirement in a case involving direct admissions by prosecutors of discriminatory
purpose." Id. at 469 n.3. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, chided the Court for
turning a blind eye to these startling statistics: "[s]tatistics are not, of course, the whole
answer, but nothing is as emphatic as zero." Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1969) (per cu-
rium)).
126. Temple University Law Professor David Kairys criticized the majority's approach
in Greene:
Unless there is a written confession of racist motivation, racist officials
and institutions are allowed by this analysis to adopt measures that harm
minorities without running into any legal obstacles. This rule not only
undercuts the constitutional prohibition of discrimination-which, con-
trary to public understanding, was faithfully enforced for, at most, only
two decades-but has made purposeful discrimination quite easy.
David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 734
(1996).
127. 85 F.3d 1074 (3d Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 1083.
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ployee, and Johnson, her immediate supervisor, both of whom are Afri-
can Americans, brought a suit against the company claiming co-workers
and superiors created a racially hostile work environment." 9 Some of the
remarks the plaintiffs complained of included references to Aman and
Johnson as "another one," "one of them," "that one in there," and "all of
you.""0 The court found these were code words for racism, especially
when viewed in conjunction with other evidence that the company fos-
tered a racially hostile work environment. The key to its finding of
purposeful discrimination was the use of "code words": "[tihe use of
'code words' can, under circumstances such as we encounter here, violate
Title VII. Indeed, a reasonable jury could conclude that the intent to dis-
criminate is implicit in these comments.' 32 The court made this ruling by
analogizing to ostensibly neutral comments found to be evidence of sex
and age discrimination. 33 The court also emphasized: "[t]here are no tal-
ismanic expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to
the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination. The
129. See id. at 1077. The plaintiffs, Aman and Johnson, sued under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. See id. at
1080. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant created a hostile work environment, paid
Black employees less than White employees, constructively discharged Aman, and fired
Johnson in retaliation for protesting discriminatory practices. See id.
130. Id. at 1082.
131. See id. at 1083. Other Black delivery employees were also harassed on a daily
basis by White employees who warned them, "don't touch anything" in customers'
homes and "don't steal." Id. at 1078. In addition, Johnson was accused of granting Aman
favoritism, while three White co-workers violated company policy by bypassing Aman,
the credit manager, to extend credit to customers. See id. The court found three instances
"particularly troubling." Id. at 1082. First, in a discussionwith Johnson, her White super-
visor stated that if problems were not resolved, "we're going to have to come up there
and get rid of all of you." Id. When asked whom he meant by "all of you," the supervisor
refused to elaborate. See id. Second, a White general manager, in anger, told Aman that
he knew all about her and two other employees, yet the only factor the three shared in
common was their race. See id. Finally, in a meeting attended by all administrative, sales,
and warehouse employees, that same general manager said that "'the blacks are against the
whites,' and that if anyone did not like it at Cort Furniture, they could leave." Id.
132. Id. at 1083.
133. The court noted that racism, like sexism, can be coded, and recognized that the
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex is implicit in certain sexual propositions, innu-
endo, and sexually derogatory language, "and thus should be recognized as a matter of
course." Id. at 1083 (citing Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir.
1990)). In addition, the Court noted that statements that employees were "'sharp young
people"' or not "'forward enough thinker[s]"' could reasonably be interpreted as evi-
dence of bias under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. at 1083
(citing Futrell v.J.1. Case, 38 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal-the intent of
the speaker. ' 3
Finally, the Aman court urged other courts to be vigilant in seeking
out latent racism in a modem world where discriminators have learned to
code their language:
Anti-discrimination laws and lawsuits have 'educated'
would-be violators such that extreme manifestations of dis-
crimination are thankfully rare .... [However], while
discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned not
to leave the proverbial 'smoking gun' behind. As one court
has recognized, 'defendants of even minimal sophistication
will neither admit discriminatory animus or [sic] leave a
paper trail demonstrating it.'
1 35
Thus federal courts have recognized that employers often use "code
words," rather than overt language, to comment on an employee's age,136
race,137 and sex.138 The decisions of these courts are consistent with other
federal courts that have had no difficulty interpreting neutral language as
code words for "drug talk" in narcotics transactions. 139 This article em-
phasizes that, as with employment discrimination and "drug talk," federal
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1081-1082 (citing Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir.
1987)).
136. See Futrell, 38 F.3d at 347. But see Krieg v. Kimball International Inc., 33 F.3d 56
(7th Cir. 1994) (finding, inter alia, that a comment that a plaintiff lacked a "sense of ur-
gency" was facially neutral and thus was not evidence of discrimination, but that
comments relating to "old salesmen" and "bright young people" were evidence of dis-
crimination).
137. See Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083.
138. See Brown v. City of Aurora, 942 F. Supp. 375, 380 (N.D. II. 1996) (explaining
that references to a female employee as "Missy, Missy," as well as comments about her
ponytail, her petite size and that she "should be at home taking care of her daughter"
could all be construed as sexist language). The Brown court found that "discrimination is
much more subtle these days and is frequently cloaked with the appearance of propriety."
Id. at 380 n.8 (citing Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082).
139. See United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that refer-
ences to "tar" and "show," as well as to "red" and "white," meant heroin, and that "one"
and "two" signified the quantity of heroin being discussed). The court noted that drug
users are increasingly wary of having their drug conversations intercepted by police, and
have thus found it necessary to "code" their drug talk: "Conversations regarding drug
transactions are rarely clear. A fact-finder must always draw inferences from veiled allu-
sions and code words." Id.
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courts should use "de-coding" in equal protection analysis when legisla-
tors use coded racist language to pass discriminatory legislation.'40
IV. "DE-CODING" EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS
A. Searching For Intent: "De-Coding" a Good Fit with Factors
for Determining Equal Protection Violations
To challenge a law based on the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the "invidious quality" of governmental action
claimed to be racially discriminatory "must be ultimately traced to a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose.' 4 ' Absent direct evidence of an intent to
discriminate, a prima facie case can be made "by showing [that] the total-
ity of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose.' 4 2 This requires the reviewing court to conduct a "sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial evidence of intent as may be available.'
1 3
Such a motive can be found by circumstantial evidence by using seven
non-exhaustive factors. Those "subjects of inquiry" are: adverse racial
impact of the official action; historical background of the decisions; spe-
cific sequence of events leading up to the challenged action; departures
from normal procedure sequence; substantive departure from routine de-
cisions; the inevitability or forseeability of consequence of the law;'" and
contemporaneous statements made by the decisionmakers.14 The first
factor focuses on the disparate impact of the law, and the remaining fac-
tors focus more on the intent behind the enactment. While district courts
have been willing to lean heavily on the disparate impact of the crack
versus cocaine law, no appellate court has found that Congress acted with
a racist motive.'" This article attempts to use "de-coding" as a tool to
140. Drug dealers understand that any conversations they have over the phone may be
used against them in court, and they code their language accordingly. Similarly, employ-
ers have become savvy enough over the years to understand that any direct references to
an employee's race, sex or age may be seen as bigoted and used against them in a court of
law. Indeed, members of Congress, many of whom are lawyers and nearly all of whom
have become masters at carefully parsing their language, are even more likely to code
their language than street criminals and employers not versed in the nuances of the law.
141. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
142. Id. at 242.
143. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
144. See id. at 266-68.
145. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
146. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing the lower
court, noting that "impact alone is not determinative absent a pattern as stark as that in
Gomillion v. Ligh!foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ... or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) ...."). The appellate court then went on to note that "the district court's findings
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reveal the purpose behind the statute using the factors set forth in Arling-
ton Heights, Davis, and Feeney.
B. The Equal Protection Factors
1. Adverse Racial Impact
In 1993, 88.3% of those convicted in federal court of selling crack
were Black, while only 4.1% of those convicted were White. 147 That
same year, 27.4% of those convicted of selling powder cocaine were
Black, while 32% were White.148 These percentages are in line with the
general disparate impact of drug laws. Although African Americans rep-
resent roughly twelve percent of the population and about the same
percentage of illegal drug users, they accounted for almost forty percent
of those arrested on drug charges in 1988 and forty-two percent in
1991.49 In 1994, African Americans made up about thirteen percent of
drug users, but accounted for thirty-five percent of drug arrests, fifty-five
percent of convictions, and seventy-four percent of those sentenced to
prison terms for drug offenses.
50
Yet, the argument persists that African Americans cannot be the vic-
tims of an adverse racial impact in this area because African Americans
disproportionately benefit from removing Black drug dealers from Black
neighborhoods.'-" However, recent studies refute this myth, and have
fall short of establishing that Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose in enacting the
statute, and that Congress selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action 'at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.'"
Id. (stating that the appellate court in Clary, like all other appellate courts to have re-
viewed the matter, found that Congress enacted the statute without the requisite racial
intent to warrant strict scrutiny).




151. For an interesting discussion on this issue, see Paul Butler's review of Randall
Kennedy's Race, Crime and the Law, in Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of
Race, Crime and the Law, 111 HAv. L. REv. 1270, 1277 (1988) (book review).
"'[Wjhat is racially discriminatory about the crack-powder distinction?' Kennedy won-
ders.... [L]ocking up black crack dealers probably helps, not harms, the black
community. The only person burdened by the law is the bad black." Id. (citing RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AN]D THE LAW 375-76 (1997). Butler responds that the Black
community is more concerned about eradicating the drug problem than punishing the
criminals. "If there is a monkey on my back--but not on my neighbor's back-I seek to
remove the monkey." Id. at 1278. See also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY
185-87 (1997) (criticizing Kennedy's view that harsh criminal penalties against women
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found that African Americans do not support "get tough" measures that
will adversely impact the African American community. 2 Regardless,
showing a racially disparate impact alone is almost always never enough
to prove an Equal Protection violation.5 3 Instead, a comprehensive look
at the intent behind the Act is necessary.154
who use crack cocaine while pregnant protects Black children rather than punishes Black
mothers). Roberts notes:
Professor Kennedy's premise that Blacks benefit from greater law en-
forcement overlooks America's history of using criminal laws to
subjugate Blacks . . . Many critics of national drug policy argue that the
'War on Drugs' serves a similar purpose today . . . This is not a neutral
offense that just happens to be applied more often to one group rather
than the other. This criminal law is virtually 'for Blacks only.'
Id. at 186-87. While Professor Roberts' critique was in relation to the prosecution of
mothers who use crack, the same argument can be made with regard to the prosecution
of crack users and sellers in general. In fact the argument is even stronger with regard to
the possession and sale of crack in general because in those cases the "victim" is either the
possessor/user of crack himself, or an adult or teenager who chooses to buy crack cocaine
on his or her own, as opposed to a child born addicted to crack, who has no choice in the
matter.
152. University of Chicago law professor Tracy Meares has attacked this myth:
These arguments are based on a simple proposition: groups that experi-
ence higher levels of criminal victimization should be more likely than
groups that experience lower levels of victimization to support 'get
tough' approaches to crime. However, the data presented here are in-
consistent with this proposition as applied to African American support
for 'get tough' approaches to drug-law enforcement.
Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization
and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BurF:. CRIM. L. Rav. 137, 160
(1997). Meares found that African Americans as a group were much less likely than
Whites to support a "get tough" position on drugs in 1987, even though they experi-
enced the highest rates of victimization the previous year. Id. Interestingly, Whites and
Blacks favored the "anti-law enforcement," or libertarian, view of drugs at roughly the
same level. See id. at 158-60. Meares terms this inconstancy a "dual frustration." Id.
Meares quotes economist Glenn Loury: "the young black men wreaking havoc in the
ghetto are still 'our youngsters' in the eyes of many of the decent poor and working-class
black people who are sometimes their victims." Id.
153. See supra note 146.
154. As discussed previously, to challenge a law based on equal protection grounds, it
must be shown that the decision making body selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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2. Historical Background of the Decision
a. Anti-Chinese Sentiment Leads to America's First Anti-Drug Law
Before 1800, opium was available in the United States as an ingredi-
ent in many multi-drug prescriptions, and was itself prescribed by
physicians against symptoms of gastrointestinal illnesses, such as cholera,
food poisoning, and parasites."'5 Almost all opium in America was im-
ported, and it was subject to a small import tax until 1915, when its
importation was outlawed (1909 for smoking opium). 56 The first drug
prohibition law, a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting public opium
dens, was enacted in an atmosphere of hostility to Chinese immigrants.
5 7
It was enforced, according to the police chief, "to keep [the Chinese]
from opening places where whites might resort to smoke."'5 '8 Momentum
carried quickly to the passage of federal legislation.5 9 The man behind the
passage of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909 1 ° was Dr. Hamil-
ton Wright, sometimes called "the father of American narcotic laws."''6
Wright warned that the use of opium was spreading from the Chinese to
the White and Black populations. 62 Of particular concern to Wright was
the effect of the drug on women: "[o]ne of the most unfortunate phases
of the habit of smoking opium in this country [was] the large number of
women who have become involved and were living as common-law
wives or cohabiting with Chinese in the Chinatowns of our various cit-
ies.,,163
Anti-Chinese sentiment and media distortions led to the passage of
the 1909 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act,' 64 which, inter alia, outlawed
the importation of smoking opium. 6 America's first anti-narcotic law
155. Opium and derivatives such as morphine grew in popularity as physicians realized
that it was cheap, compact, and had a standard strength; it became widely used during the
Civil War. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DIsEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CON-
TROL 1 (3d ed. 1999).
156. See id. at 2.
157. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 143.
158. Id.
159. "Suddenly, in 1909 smoking opium was excluded from the United States.
Weighing heavily against it was its symbolic association since mid-century with the Chi-
nese, who were actively persecuted, especially on the West Coast." MUSTO, supra note
155, at 3.
160. 21 U.S.C. § 176-85 (1909) (repealed 1970).
161. MUSTO, supra note 155, at 31.
162. See id. at 43.
163. Id.
164. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 775 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
165. See 21 U.S.C. 5 178 (1909) (repealed 1970).
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was passed with racist animus, fueled by media distortion and the willing-
ness of lawmakers to scapegoat people of color. 166 Thus began a trend that
has been consistently replicated in the initial prohibition of almost every
major narcotic, including crack cocaine.
b. Marijuana and the Mexicans
The use of marijuana as an intoxicant can be traced back "to the
earliest beginnings of history," and it was cultivated in Asia and the Near
East "from the earliest known times to the present. 1 67 In America, it was
first grown for its fiber and was an integral part of the colonial and na-
tional economy.' r8 From the mid-Nineteenth century until the 1950s,
marijuana was used for a wide range of medical purposes." Marijuana
entered into general use in 1920 but was not a popular drug until the
1960sY'
0
The recreational smoking of marijuana was generally limited to
Mexican itinerant workers in the Southwest, and by 1910 its use began to
spread into southern port cities, especially New Orleans. 17 During the
1920s, Mexican immigrants, who used the drug to relax, began to rapidly
migrate into California and Louisiana, then up to Colorado and Utah. 172
As with opium, Whites garnered support for the outlaw of marijuana by
linking the drug with dangerous pushers of color; this time those pushers
were Mexicans. 73 Media hysteria was noted by the federal Bureau of
166. On March 1, 1879, the San Francisco Post opined that "'[the chinaman has im-
poverished our country, degraded our free labor, and hoodlumized our children. He is
now destroying our young men with opium"' Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 n.10.




170. See id. at 70 (quoting EDWARD M. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS (1972)).
171. See id.
172. See MUSTO, supra note 155, at 219.
173. As Mexicans lost their usefiness as cheap laborers during the Great Depression,
scapegoating snowballed into nativist sentiments to outlaw the drug. Groups such as the
American Coalition, which favored marijuana prohibition, fueled the fire. As one Coali-
tion member, C.M. Goeth of Sacramento, commented:
Marijuana, perhaps now the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct
by-product of unrestricted Mexican immigration. Easily grown, it has
been asserted that it has recently been planted between rows in a Califor-
nia penitentiary garden. Mexican peddlers have been caught distributing
sample marijuana cigarets [sic] to school children.
Id. at 220.
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Narcotics, which urged a more sober approach to the drug problem,174 a
situation that would repeat itself with the hysteria surrounding crack co-
caine .
African Americans were also easy scapegoats. In 1926, an expose in a
series of articles, under banner headlines, linked the drug with Blacks,
schoolchildren, and violent crimes committed by drug-crazed marijuana176
users. The scapegoating of Mexicans and African Americans eventually
led to Congress outlawing the sale, possession and use of marijuana in
1937 with the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act, the first federal law to
outlaw the drug.178 By this time, the Bureau of Narcotics switched course,
and its commissioner, Harry J. Anslinger, spearheaded a campaign to
outlaw the drug by making outrageous claims linking the use of mari-
juana with violent crime.179
174. The 1932 Federal Bureau of Narcotics report found:
This abuse of the drug is noted among the Latin American or Spanish-
speaking population. The sale of cannabis cigarettes occurs to a consider-
able degree in States along the Mexican border and in cities of the
Southwest and West, as well as in New York City, and, in fact, wherever
there are settlements of Latin Americans.
A great deal of public interest has been aroused by newspaper articles ap-
pearing from time to time on the evils of the abuse of marijuana or
Indian hemp, and more attention has been focused upon specific cases
reported of the abuse of the drug than would otherwise have been the
case. This publicity tends to magnify the extent of the evil and lends
color to an inference that there is an alarming spread of the improper use
of the drug, whereas the actual increase in such use may not have been
inordinately large.
Id. at 221.
175. The DEA report stated that "[c]rack is currently the subject of considerable media
attention. The result has been a distortion of the public perception of the extent of crack
use as compared to the use of other drugs .... [C]rack presently appears to be a secon-
dary rather than primary problem in most areas." James A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine:
Basuco, Crack and Other Coca Products, 14 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 461, 482 (Fall 1987). In
fact, during the 1980s, crack was unavailable in New York City, except for in the Wash-
ington Heights neighborhood, and was nowhere to be found in Chicago. See id. at 483-
84.
176. See MUSTO, supra note 155, at 229.
177. Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551.
178. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 167, at 69-74.
179. Anslinger told American Magazine:
An entire family was murdered by a youthful addict in Florida .... They
found the youth staggering about in a human slaughterhouse. With an ax
he had killed his father, mother, two brothers, and a sister. He seemed to
be in a daze .... He had no recollection of having committed the
crime. The boy said that he had [been] ... smoking... marijuana.
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c. Cocaine and African Americans
Although chewing coca leaves had been part of Andean culture for a
thousand years, it was not introduced into the United States and Europe
until the late nineteenth century. '8 The steady progress of science noted
cocaine's deleterious effects so that, by 1906, its use was curtailed with
the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act.1"" From then on, "the drug
moved to the underworld of criminals and the chic.
1 2
Momentum gained to prohibit the importation of cocaine and her-
oin, culminating with the passage of the Harrison Act of 1914,13 which
was the first federal law to prohibit the distribution of cocaine and her-
oin. While some members of Congress were concerned that the Act
would pave the way to alcohol prohibition (a recreational drug used by
• 181
many Whites), it was the association of cocaine and heroin with Blacks
that fueled the passage of the Act.' 6 Congressman Harrison played on
Whites' fears that Whites must be protected from the influx of Blacks'
cocaine habits,18 7 an overtly racist message that would appear in a code
during the crack cocaine debates.'8 Wright also played on Whites' fears
that cocaine use would lead to Black-on-White violence, especially
Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 n.17 (citing LARRY SOLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: A HISTORY
Or MARIJUANA IN AMERICA 34 (1979)).
180. See Inciardi, supra note 175, at 461. After importing tons of Peruvian coca leaves
to his native land of Corsica, Angelo Mariani produced an extract that he mixed with
wine and called Vin Coca Mariani. See id. The product, touted as a cure for fatigue,
"brought Mariam immediate wealth and fame, as well as a medal of appreciation from
Pope Leo XVII, who used the drink as a source of comfort in his many years of ascetic
retirement." Id. at 461-462. Meanwhile, in Atlanta, Georgia, John Styth Pemberton,
who had been marketing various medicines using coca, noted Mariani's success and de-
veloped a product that he registered as French Wine Coca-ldeal Nerve and Tonic
Stimulant. See id. at 462. The next year, Pemberton "added a supplementary ingredient,
changed it into a soft drink, and renamed his concoction Coca-Cola." Id.
181. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
182. Inciardi, supra note 175, at 463-64.
183. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785.
184. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775.
185. See MUSTO, supra note 155, at 66.
186. Francis Burton Harrison, a representative from Mississippi who sponsored the
Act, favored cocaine prohibition because cocaine leaves were used in "Coca-Cola and
Pepsi-Cola and all those things that are sold to Negroes all over the South." Id. at 46.
187. Harrison "warned Congress of the drug-crazed blacks in the South whose drug
habits 'threaten[ed] to creep into the higher social ranks of the country."' Clary, 846 F.
Supp. at 775 (citingJ. HELLER, DRUGS AND MINORITY OPPRESSION (1975)).
188. See infra notes 226-44 (discussing the coded theme that Whites needed to be
protected from the harms of crack cocaine, a drug Whites feared was creeping into White
neighborhoods).
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against White women,' s9 more themes that would reappear in code dur-
ing the crack cocaine debates.'9 Throughout history, Whites associated
certain narcotics with certain ethnic groups, believed a pattern of criminal
and immoral conduct was the direct result of taking these drugs, and were
fearful of the corrupting influence these drugs would have on the White
communities. 91 This same pattern emerged in the passing of crack co-
caine legislation in the 1980s, but by then legislators were savvy enough
to couch their racist appeals in "coded" language.' 92
3. Specific Sequence of Events Leading Up
to the Challenged Decision
By the 1950s, cocaine use spread into the "beatnik" culture of New
York City's Greenwich Village and San Francisco's North Beach, and
became known as "the rich man's drug."1 93 In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the drug moved into mainstream society.194 "Freebasing," the
smoking of freebase cocaine, became popular in the 1970s, so that by
1977 it was estimated that ten percent of the four million users in the
189. In expert testimony before Congress, Dr. Wright told members of Congress that
"it has been authoritatively stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of
rape by the Negroes of the South and other sections of the country." MUSTO, supra note
155, at 43-44 (citation omitted).
190. See infra notes 245-51 (discussing the coded links between crime and crack use);
see also infra notes 259-65 (discussing the links between crack use and sexual promiscuity
and prostitution).
191. Musto writes:
By 1914 prominent newspapers, physicians, pharmacists, and congress-
men believed opiates and cocaine predisposed habitues toward insanity
and crime. They were widely seen as substances associated with foreign-
ers or alien subgroups. Cocaine raised the specter of the wild Negro,
opium the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps in the slums; it was
feared that use of all these drugs was spreading into the "higher classes."
MUSTO, supra note 155, at 65.
192. See infra notes 226-44 (discussing the coded themes legislators used to appeal to
Whites' fears of African Americans and Latinos).
193. Inciardi, supra note 175, at 464.
194. Inciardi notes that this increase was due to legislation curtailing the use of am-
phetamines and quaaludes and other abused sedatives, in addition to the building of the
Pan American Highway through the Huallaga River valley in the high jungles of Peru.
The reduction in amphetamines lead to an increase in the demand for cocaine, and the




United States used freebasing as the sole means of cocaine use.'9 5
(Freebase cocaine is a different chemical product from cocaine itself.')
"Crack" cocaine, which is a different chemical product from either
powder or freebase cocaine, was known initially as "rock" or "base."' 97 It
was first reported in the early 1970s, and it was rediscovered in the early
1980s on the East and West coasts.' 9" Although crack appeared in Miami
as early as 1982, it was generally limited to the Caribbean and Haitian
communities.'"
The first mention of crack in the major media occurred on Novem-
ber 17, 1985, in The New York Times.2°° The media picked up on the
story, and within eleven months more than one thousand stories were
written that featured crack prominently.2° The word filtered down to the
street. As one 14-year-old Black male crack user explained in one of the
first studies on the drug:
Sure, we all [knew] about it, but didn't know much [a]bout
what it really was. They tell us that, 'ya smoke it mon,' so
195. See id. at 465.
196. Inciardi explains:
In the process of freebasing, street cocaine-which is usually in the form
of a hydrochloride salt-is treated with a liquid base (such as ammonia or
baking soda) to remove the hydrochloric acid. The free cocaine, or co-
caine base (and hence the name freebase) is then dissolved in a solvent
such as ether, from which the purified cocaine is crystallized. These
crystals are then crushed and used in a special glass pipe. Smoking free-
base cocaine provides a more potent "rush" and a more powerful high
than regular cocaine (emphasis in original).
Id.
197. "Crack is processed from cocaine hydrochloride by using ammonia or baking
soda and water, and heating it to remove the hydrochloride. The result is a pebble-sized
crystalline form of cocaine base. Crack is neither freebase cocaine nor purified cocaine."
Id. It is less potent than conventional freebase, and ranges in purity from five percent to
forty percent. See id. at 469. The drug was nicknamed "crack" because of the crackling
sound it makes when smoked. See id.
198. Due to the Colombian government's limitation of the use of ether for trans-
forming coca paste, the processing moved into the Caribbean and South Florida. See id. at
468-69. "Immigrants from Jamaica, Trinidad and locations along the Leeward and
Windward Islands chain introduced the crack prototype to Caribbean inner-city popula-
tions in Miami and New York, where it was ultimately produced from cocaine
hydrochloride rather than coca paste." Id. at 469-70. At the same time, a Los Angeles
chemist rediscovered the rock, and it became a success on the West coast, as well. See id.
at 470. The success was due to its quicker 'high,' lower cost, and easier transportability.
See id.
199. See id. at 475.
200. See id. at 481.
201. See id.
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we'd think it was some fancy freebase. Smoking coke we
knew was expensive, least we[] thought it was, so we just
didn't do it . . . Guess we[] really didn't understand and all
that."2
The media did not understand the subject very well either, and re-
sorted to shameless hyperbole to sell magazines and newspapers.203
Researchers were finding crack was not a national plague, but rather a
phenomenon isolated to the inner cities of less than a dozen urban ar-
eas.204 By late August 1986, the hysteria surrounding crack had reached an
outrageous level, such that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
felt compelled to issue a statement attempting to quell the hysteria:
Crack is currently the subject of considerable media atten-
tion. The result has been a distortion of the public
perception of the extent of crack use as compared to the use
of other drugs. With multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine
hydrochloride available and with snorting continuing to be
the primary route of cocaine administration, crack presently
appears to be a secondary rather than a primary problem in
205
most areas.
Still, just as the media and legislators ignored the recommendations
of caution from the former Federal Bureau of Narcotics,2 0 the media
largely ignored the DEA report, and the myth continued that crack was
"everywhere." 20 7 Once again, Dr. Inciardi's study refuted this media
202. Id. at 476.
203. For example, "Newsweek claimed that crack was the biggest story since Vietnam
and the fall of the Nixon presidency, and other media outlets compared it to the plagues
of medieval Europe." Id. at 482.
204. See id.
205. Id. A study of crack use in the Miami area confirmed the DEA's report that
White and Hispanic drug users from the middle and upper-income sections of Dade
County could not get their hands on crack. See id. at 483. As one student in the study
remarked: "I can get you any kind of drug you want, except crack-unless I make it
myself and I don't know how. I could always go up to Liberty City, but there's no way
I'd go up there without a few bodyguards and a couple of guns." Id. Crack was also simi-
larly available only in the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City, and was
nowhere to be found in Chicago. See id. at 483-84.
206. See MUSTO, supra note 155 (discussing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics report
issued in response to the irrational reaction to the marijuana problem in the 1920s).
207. Newsweek described the crack scene as "an inferno of craving and despair." Id. at
484. USA Today titillated readers with the story of Katrina Lincoln: "Katrina Lincoln was
17 when she first walked into a crack house in the Bronx. By then she was selling her




myth: almost two-thirds of the subjects he studied in the Miami area did
not use crack on a daily basis, and use among daily users was generally




4. Departures from Normal Procedure Sequence
The district court in Clary found the media hype surrounding "the
horror of crack cocaine" and the proposed 1986 Controlled Substance
Act caused Congress to react "irrationally and arbitrarily. ' ' 2°9 The Act was
advanced through an election-year Congress, leaving behind a limited
legislative record. 210 Even Eric E. Sterling, counsel to the House
Subcommittee on Crime during the crack debate, was taken aback by the
frantic rush: "[i]t was sheer panic. Everyone felt that the spotlight for
solving the drug crisis was on them. And if it wasn't, they wanted it to be
on them., 211 Moreover, the disproportionate penalties between powder
and crack cocaine skyrocketed, jumping from a 20:1 ratio, when the bill
was introduced, to the ultimate 100:1 ratio, for no logical reason.2 1 2
In reality, a study of Miami adolescent crack users found the median amount spent
on crack was $18.33 per day; an analysis of Detroit arrestees found the median daily use of
$21.43 per day; and another study of New York addicts found that only one-fourth of
heavy crack users spent between $101 and $1,000 a month on crack. See STmvEr' R.
BELENKO, CRACK AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-DRUG POLICY 62-63 (1993).
208. Inciardi, supra note 175, at 485. Moreover, as the DEA study confirmed, crack
cocaine was not the major drug problem. See id. at 485. The proportions of crack, pow-
der cocaine and alcohol use were similar. See id. at 485. Furthermore, crack was not an
initiation drug, and was not even the preferred drug of choice among users; "marijuana
established top honors." Id.
209. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 784.
210. See Angeli, supra note 12, at 1227. "'Congress dispensed with much of its typical
deliberative legislative process, including committee hearings'[,] when it considered the
cocaine sentencing scheme." Id. (quoting United States Sentencing Commission, Special
Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 162 (Feb. 1995)).
211. Howard Manly, Harsh Line Drawn on Crack Cocaine: Tough Penalties Found to Affect
Blacks Most, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1994, at 1.
212. Senator Paula Hawkins initially pushed for tough sentences that did not distin-
guish between crack and powder cocaine. See Angeli, supra note 12, at 1227. Two weeks
later, however, Senator Hawkins joined Senator Alfonse D'Amato in proposing a 20:1
ratio. See id. Another bill introduced by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, on behalf of
the Reagan Administration, similarly called for a 20:1 ratio. See id. However, by the time
the bill was introduced in September, the ratio was bumped up to 50:1. See id. The next
day, in a last-minute effort to "redouble Congressional seriousness," Congress arbitrarily
set the ratio of crack versus powder cocaine from 50:1 to 100:1. Id. at 1228 n.135; Clary,
846 F. Supp. at 784.
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Furthermore, no congressional committee ever produced a report
analyzing the Act's key provisions.2t3
5. Substantive Departure from Normal Procedure
The penalties were also unusually harsh. The Act made crack the
only drug with a mandatory minimum penalty for a first offense of simple
possession.214 Furthermore, possession of between one and five grams of
crack, depending on criminal history, results in a minimum penalty of
215five years in prison. In contrast, possession of any quantity of any other
drug (heroin, powder cocaine, or any other controlled substance) results
• 216
in a maximum penalty of one year in prison.
6. The Inevitability or Forseeability of the Consequence of the Law
The media reports leading up to the enactment led members of
Congress to believe that crack was primarily a problem of African Ameri-
cans and Latinos.217 Moreover, another bill targeted so-called "crack
houses," which were primarily thought to be located in inner-city neigh-
borhoods that were primarily African American and Latino. 28 In other
words, members of Congress pushed through a bill that punished crack
cocaine users and dealers, but also expended extra effort to specifically
target the "crack houses" in minority neighborhoods. Thus, it was fore-
seeable-indeed, inevitable-that the law would have a disparate impact
on African Americans and Latinos.2' 9 However, as evidenced by several
comments by legislators during the crack cocaine debates, what was of
213. See Angeli, supra note 12, at 1227.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1228.
216. See id. "This disparity for simple possession is inconsistent with Congress' stated
goals of attacking drug distributors and is opposed by both the Sentencing Commission
and the Justice Department." Id.
217. See 132 CONG. REc. 8292 (1986) (discussing THE PALM BEACH POST & EVENING
TIMES article, introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Lawton Chiles, de-
claring that "most of the dealers, as with past drug trends, are black or Hispanic" and that
"whites rarely sell the cocaine rocks").
218. See infra note 231 (describing the high concentration of African Americans and
Latinos in the "inner city" neighborhoods of America's large metropolitan areas).
219. In 1998, 49% of the crack users were White, 34% were Black, and 17% were
Hispanic. See Wickham, supra note 6 (citing a study by the National Clearinghouse for
Alcohol and Drug Information). In that same year, 85% of those convicted for selling
crack were Black, giving rise to charges of selective arrest and/or prosecution. See id.
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particular concern to them was the potential for the drug to reach the
White community. °
7. Contemporary Statements Made by the Decision Makers
The crack cocaine debates were filled with coded racist references
and the introduction of racist newspaper articles. "De-coding" these ref-
erences can reveal their racist intent. The aforementioned history of
attaching racial significance to anti-drug laws is important because what
these "code words" mean is in conformity with the history of attaching
racial significance to anti-drug laws.22'
Historically, racist anti-drug laws contained three general themes.
First, anti-drug laws were passed to "save" Whites from "depraved" mi-
222
norities. Incorporated into this theme was the notion that the law had
to be passed because a certain drug, historically associated with people of
color, was suddenly seeping into White communities. Second, previous
anti-drug laws were thought to be necessary because the drugs were used
by crazed criminals of color.22 3 The exaggerated potency of this drug, and
what it made people of color do, is an integral part of this theme. Third,
anti-drug laws were passed to protect White women from becoming the
sexual slaves of drug-pushing pimps, invariably portrayed as people of
color.224
220. See infra notes 226-44 (discussing the three coded racist themes prevalent during
the crack cocaine debates.)
221. See supra notes 155-92 and accompanying text (discussing the history of racism
behind the passage of American anti-narcotics laws).
222. See infra notes 226-44 (discussing the history of protecting Whites from drugs
associated with minorities). Significantly, with regard to "de-coding" comments in the
Record, it is not required to show that a racially neutral law was passed with racial ani-
mus; rather it can be shown that a law was passed with an intent to protect, rather than
punish, based on race. According to George Washington University Law Professor Mi-
chael Selmi, "the Court has always treated affirmative action as a form of intentional
discrimination, albeit one that can be justified under certain circumstances." Michael
Selni, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. LJ.
279, 289 (1997). Thus, as Sebni explains, "in the affirmative action context, the motive is
usually to aid, rather than to harm, a particular group, and rarely does a question of ani-
mus arise in these cases." Id.
223. See infra notes 245-51 (discussing the historical depiction of drugs used by crazed
people of color).
224. See infra notes 252-65 (discussing the history of passing anti-drug legislation to
protect women from drug- and sex-crazed minorities).
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a. The Need to Protect White Communities
From a "Colored" Drug
America's first anti-drug legislation was passed to "protect" Whites
from the Chinese, who the media and politicians felt were having a cor-
rupting influence on the Whites who came in contact with them.225
Similarly, the promulgators of the first anti-marijuana legislation in the
1930s were nativist Whites, who felt that "depraved" Mexicans and
Blacks were corrupting White schoolchildren. 26 Furthermore, support for
the passage of the Harrison Act of 1914, which outlawed cocaine and
heroin, was fueled by fears that the drug was spreading from the "wild
Negro" and the "devious Chinese" to the upper echelon of White soci-
ety.227 David Musto, an expert on the history of America's anti-drug laws,
explains:
By 1914 prominent newspapers, physicians, pharmacists,
and congressmen believed opiates and cocaine predisposed
habitues toward insanity and crime. They were widely seen
as substances associated with foreigners or alien subgroups.
Cocaine raised the specter of the wild Negro, opium the
devious Chinese, morphine the tramps of the slums; it was
feared that use of all these drugs was spreading into the
'higher classes.'
2 8
The same sentiment of the need to protect the White community
from the dangers of African Americans and Latinos of the inner city was
evident during the crack cocaine debates. Members of Congress, in their
comments and in the articles they praised and introduced into the Con-
gressional Record, portrayed crack as an inner-city problem seeping into
the suburbs and rural villages. Implicit in this argument is that crack, once
only an African American and Latino problem, was suddenly becoming a
White problem. Senator Heflin expressed this theme in his depiction of
the crack situation:
[T]here is a violent war being fought in America. For many
years this war was fought for us by special agents in dark,
stinking alleys-through garbage-strewn streets, and in the
burned out, abandoned buildings of our large metropolitan
areas. But now, the battleground has moved into middle-
225. See supra notes 1-2, 166.
226. MUSTO, supra note 155, at 216-29.




class neighborhoods, into glass skyscrapers, and even into
school playgrounds. This war was once fought only in ur-
ban America, but increasingly, there are daily skirmishes on
country roads, on remote rural routes, and in the tree-lined
streets of small towns and villages.229
Senator Heflin was clear in articulating the crack dilemma: crack was
not a problem when its use was confined to those people who inhabited
the "dark, stinking alleys," "garbage-strewn streets," and the "burned
out, abandoned buildings of our large metropolitan areas"2---pejorative
descriptions of places where African Americans live.21 Yet, in the next
sentence he alerts his colleagues to the real problem: crack, once only a
problem of Black America, was moving into "middle-class neighbor-
hoods," "glass skyscrapers," "school playgrounds," "remote rural routes,"
and "the tree-lined streets of small towns and villages" 23 2-euphemistic
descriptions of places where White people live. 233 By 'de-coding' his
statement, Senator Heflin told the American people that, while crack co-
caine was once only a problem in the Black neighborhoods, Congress
needed to take action swiftly because crack was spreading from the Black
and brown inner city to the "country roads," "remote rural routes," and
the "tree-lined streets of small towns and villages" of White America.
The newspaper and magazine articles were even more forthright
about the spread of crack cocaine from the Black inner city to the White
suburbs and rural towns and villages. Senator Lawton Chiles introduced
into the Congressional Record what he called an "excellent series" of
articles whose authors and publisher "should be commended. ' '234 The
229. 132 CONG. PEC. S8291 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing
a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1248 n.76 (1995).
Calmore explains: "[t]here is a racialized stigma that is associated with the inner city." Id.
(citing Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But
...": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 215-17
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991)). See also Delgado & Stefanic, supra
note 111, at 1291 n.221. The authors list a number of "items that today seem innocuous
or only mildly troublesome." Among the list were "[c]ode words such as 'articulate (or
qualified) black,' 'those people,' 'welfare mothers,' and 'inner-city crime.' " Id. (emphasis
added).
232. 132 CONG. Rac. S8291 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
233. This depiction was not only a coded message that crack was seeping into White
neighborhoods, it was also a complete fiction. See Inciardi, supra note 175, at 482
(detailing a report from the Drug Enforcement Agency that found that, despite the media
hype to the contrary, crack could only be found in small parts of certain large metropoli-
tan areas).
234. 132 CONG. Rac. at S8291 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
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article, published by the Palm Beach Post & Evening Times, claimed, as a
matter of fact, that "most of the dealers, as with past drug trends, are
black or Hispanic."23' The article also claimed that "whites rarely sell the
cocaine rocks., 236 Then the article drew the reader's attention to the true
victims:
Street sales of cocaine rocks have occurred in the same
neighborhoods where other drugs were sold in the past:
run-down, black neighborhoods from Delray Beach to Fort
Pierce. But the drug market also is creeping into other
neighborhoods. An interracial neighborhood east of How-
ard Park has become one of West Palm Beach's most highly
visible cocaine rock areas. Less than a block from where
unsuspecting white retirees play tennis, bands of young
black men push their rocks on passing motorists, interested
or not.
237
Not only does the article portray African Americans and Latinos as
the perpetrators, and "unsuspecting" Whites as the victims, it also clearly
states that crack was spreading from minority neighborhoods like a conta-
gion: from the "run-down" Black neighborhoods, into "an interracial
neighborhood," and finally into White neighborhoods. The article thus
posits that the crack problem was directly related to the color ratio of that
community.
However, the article also states the race problem in reverse. It warns
that if African Americans and Latinos do not come to White neighbor-
hoods, White kids will have to do the reverse commute of drug
trafficking: "[f]or the growing numbers of the white middle class who
have become hooked on cocaine rock, buying the drug can be like step-
ping into a foreign culture," the article sympathized73 The article also
looks to further repercussions of such trips into the "foreign culture" of
Latino and Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods:
Police have encountered several houses where Hispanics
and Haitians sold cocaine rocks while surrounded by icons
of Santeria, a Caribbean folk religion that mixes Catholicism
and traditional African beliefs .... The statues were of Mary
and Jesus, but Mary carried a sword and Jesus a club.23 9




239. Id. at 8294.
Cracking the Code
Other articles warned that the spread of crack had the potential to
erode White values and purity. In an article also discussed during the
congressional hearings, the reporter found a high school student to talk
about drugs. "'I'll tell you,' said a baby-faced white senior boy, 'you
won't find much drugs on campus anyway. Off campus, that's another
story. But most of the kids that are into drugs quit school.' "240 Notice the
explicit reference to the "baby-faced white senior boy" who held strong
against the temptation of crack, ostensibly because he avoided the off-
campus world of the African American or Latino crack dealer.
Conversely, the article predicts a rapid plunge for the White kids
who seek out the inner-city neighborhoods of color:
At age 14, the Joe his mother knew was his troop's Boy
Scout of the Year for the second year in a row. Three years
later, the Joe his friends knew was a tall, wiry blond who on
trips to buy cocaine rocks at Fred's Motel west of Lantana
would pack a .357 Magnum handgun in the waistband of
his pants.241
Again, note the explicit reference to the "tall, wiry blond," i.e., White
child, who went from a Boy Scout to a drug addict who felt compelled
to carry a gun. Keeping in line with this theme of protecting White
communities is the comment, made by several members of Congress, that
crack can hit home anywhere.242 Senator Roth warned, "[c]rack seems to
be an egalitarian drug, attracting users of all races, colors, and creeds, all
walks of life, and income, and all degrees of dependence., 24 3 Similarly,
Senator Heflin urged members of Congress:
All must now lend their efforts and their resolve if we are to
win this war. Every day the death tolls and casualty counts
rise. This war knows no particular class, race, age or eco-
nomic group. It damages all segments of society-leaving in
its path only waste and sorrow.... Mr. President, the en-
emy of whom I speak is the supplier, pusher, and peddler of




242. See, eg., id.
243. "Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Invest(gations of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
244. 132 Cong. Rec. 26458 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heffin).
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In other words, the Senators, along with the newspaper articles in-
troduced into the Congressional Record, sent a coded message to White
America that crack had the potential of becoming their problem, too.
This was not an egalitarian call to arms-it was a colorblind slur.
b. The Drug is Pushed by Crazed Criminals of Color
Every major American law first prohibiting a particular narcotic
portrayed the problem as one of criminals of color threatening the safety
of vulnerable Whites. The Chinese and their opium in the late nine-
teenth century "hoodlumized our children., 245 Similarly, violent crimes
in the South were apparently attributable to drug-crazed blacks who
committed crimes, especially rape, because they were high on marijuana
and/or cocaine. 24 Again, this theme ran throughout the crack cocaine
debates.
The Palm Beach Post & Evening Times started a series of articles on
the crack cocaine problem, introduced into the Congressional Record,
by noting how crack was turning the country into criminals:
Men have given up their paychecks. Women have prosti-
tuted themselves. Children have stolen from their parents.
Men and women have stolen appliances, jewelry and televi-
sions from their families and friends. Why? Over the past
year in South Florida, a new marketing form for cocaine,
packaged to give the drug its most seductive and addictive
punch, has appeared in-and in some cases taken over-
quiet residential neighborhoods of Palm Beach County and
the Treasure Coast.4 7
The article explains that "[p]olice admit they have no statistics to show
that the rise in cocaine use is related to a rise in the crime rate," but "they
base their belief of a connection on confessions in which suspects arrested
in burglary and robbery cases admitted that they stole to support a co-
245. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 n.10.
246. Musto notes:
By 1914 prominent newspapers, physicians, pharmacists, and congress-
men believed opiates and cocaine predisposed habitus toward insanity
and crime. They were widely seen as substances associated with foreign-
ers or alien subgroups. Cocaine raised the specter of the wild Negro,
opium the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps of the slums; it was
feared that use of all these drugs was spreading into the 'higher classes.'
MusTo, supra note 155, at 65.
247. 132 CONG. Rxc. S8291 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
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caine rock habit. 2 4 Claims that crack use led to sharp increases in violent
crime, though, have turned out to be grossly overstated. 49 However, the
series of articles also polluted the debate with the notion that African
Americans were predators, and Whites were their victims.2 50 For example,
as discussed earlier, one of the articles explicitly warned Whites of the
grave crack problem: "[1]ess than a block from where unsuspecting white
retirees play tennis, bands of young black men push their rocks on passing
motorists, interested or not., 251 In other words, members of Congress
introduced articles into the Record that sent a coded message to White
America that crack was unleashing criminals of color into their commu-
nities.
c. Crack-Crazed Black and Latino Pimps Turn
White Women into Prostitutes
Historically, protecting the chastity of White women has been a
subtext of criminal laws in general, and drug laws in particular. In
248. Id. at 8292.
249. See, e.g., BELENKO, supra note 207, at 103. Belenko reviewed numerous empirical
studies on crime and crack cocaine use. He found:
[W]hile the crack subculture can be characterized as more violent and
crime-involved as previous or parallel drug subcultures, the reasons for
this are complex and not necessarily a function of the psychopharmaco-
logical effects of crack. Thus media and public fears of a direct causal
relationship between crack and non-drug crime do not seem to be con-
firmed by the data.
Id. It must be noted that at least one senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, warned his col-
leagues:
If we can blame crime on crack, our politicians are off the hook. For-
gotten are the failed schools, the malign welfare programs, the desolate
neighborhoods, the wasted years. Only crack is to blame. One is tempted
to think that if crack did not exist, someone somewhere would have re-
ceived a Federal grant to develop it .... [I]t is long past time that our
leaders stop their hysterical grandstanding about new drugs and get to
work on the old, persistent problems of crime, race and poverty.
132 CONG. REc. 26455 (1986) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
250. See, e.g., id. at 8292 (statement of Sen. Heflin).
251. Id.
252, As far back as 1697, Pennsylvania enacted the death penalty for Black men who
raped White women and castrated them for attempted rape, while White men who
committed the same offense would be fined, whipped, or imprisoned for one year. See P.
Finkleman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063, 2101 n. 187 (1993). According to
Representative Sisson of Mississippi, lynching in the South was kept legal to "protect our
girls and womenfolk from these black brutes. When these black fiends keep their hands
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particular, the notion of "white slavery" of women took hold near the
turn of the century, leading to the White Slave Traffic Act (popularly
known as the Mann Act) of 1910.23 The Mann Act made it a felony to
"knowingly transport any woman or girl across state lines for prostitution,
debauchery or any other immoral purpose. 2 4 According to Cornell Law
Professor Barbara Holden-Smith, the victims were White women, while
255the perpetrators were immigrants or Black men.
Professor Holden-Smith traces this sentiment back to journalist
George Kibbe Turner's first major article on "white slavery," which ap-
peared in McClure's Magazine in 1907 and 1909.256 She explains:
Turner also managed to tap into the society's other bot-
tomless reservoir of bigotry by suggesting the 'vicious negro
from the countryside,' along with 'hundreds of thousands of
rough and unrestrained male laborers' were the major
sources of urban lawlessness, bringing prostitution and a
threat to 'the chastity of women.' Turner ostensibly suggests
that immigrants and blacks were the chief customers of the
white women enslaved by the prostitution rings.
25 7
Protecting the chastity of White women was also an important sub-
text behind the passage of anti-drug laws. Supporters of the Harrison Act
warned Whites that "it has been authoritatively stated that cocaine is of-
ten the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the Negroes of the South
and other sections of the country., 25 8 Following this historical pattern, the
crack cocaine debate contained a coded theme that crack had the poten-
259tial to ruin the chastity of White women.
off the throats of the women of the South then lynching will stop." Barbara Holden-
Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8
YALE LJ. & FEMINIsM 31, 55 (1996).
253. See White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421-2424 (1988)).
254. Id.
255. See Holden-Smith, supra note 252, at 61.
256. Id. at 62.
257. Id.
258. MUSTO, supra note 155, at 43-44.
259. One article noted, "[s]o the pretty young girl with dirty-blonde hair, deep blue
eyes and a model's figure says she started stealing. She needed money to buy the rock."
132 CONG. REc. 8294 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin). It doesn't take a huge leap for-
ward to understand that readers were to be alarmed that "the pretty young girl with dirty-
blonde hair, deep blue eyes and a model's figure" may even start selling her body if the
stealing isn't enough. It is also significant that nowhere to be found in the Record were
articles portraying "baby-faced black girls with curly locks, and rich, brown eyes" who
resorted to a life of theft or prostitution to support their crack habit. The articles must
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First, the debate was permeated with the notion that women will sell
their bodies for crack. One article introduced at the debate notes the par-
ticular susceptibility of the drug to turn women into prostitutes: "[mien
have given up their paychecks, [w]omen have prostituted themselves."
' 60
Quoting police officers, the article warns that "dealers have told them
that women freely will trade intercourse or oral sex for a single rock.,
261
This notion was confirmed during the "Crack" Hearing in the Senate,
when a drug dealer named Michael Taylor testified:
[A] prostitute might work the streets all night, returning to
the crack house each time she put together a purse of $200
or $300. Some crack houses specialize in women customers
only, allowing no men inside and catering primarily to
prostitutes. Men run such crack houses.262
Taylor also said the crack houses were a sort of singles scene for
crack addicts. "Cocaine smokers may see friends in crack houses, men
may make dates with women," he testified.2 6
Second, African Americans and Latinos were portrayed as sexual
predators. A Newsweek article, which was repeatedly praised by members
of Congress, described West 107th Street in Manhattan as "a fringe
neighborhood populated by low-income blacks and Hispanics," that was
home to "young girls in doorways trying to sell themselves for the $5 it
costs to get high." 264 It is also home to "the ghetto's inverted social peck-
ing order," where "rock cocaine has taken on the social esteem that being
a pimp had 20 years ago., 265 Thus, since women-especially White
women-were portrayed as vulnerable to sexual exploitation, it is not a
long logical leap to conclude these articles raised Whites' fears of a re-
newed form of White slavery. Therefore, the anti-crack discourse during
the crack cocaine debates fell into an historical pattern of passing criminal
laws in general, and drug laws in particular, to protect the chastity of
White women.
have assumed that the chastity of Black women wasn't as important, or that Black women
were naturally susceptible to selling their bodies for drugs.
260. Id. at 8291.
261. Id. at 8292.
262. "Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986).
263. Id.
264. 132 CONG. REC. 13027 (1986).
265. Id.
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C. The Crack Statute Violates the Equal Protection Clause
"De-coding" the racist comments of legislators, along with evidence
conforming to other factors approved by the Supreme Court in its tradi-
tional equal protection analysis, shows that Congress enacted the crack
cocaine legislation with a racially discriminatory purpose, and thus, strict
scrutiny must be applied. Therefore, the government can only show the
law is constitutional when it serves a compelling government interest and
266is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
Congress increased the penalties for crack cocaine due to a belief
that it had greater potency, was more addictive, cost less, and was in-
creasingly prevalent in comparison to powder cocaine.2 67 However,
members of Congress failed to present evidence for these assertions.66 For
example, Dr. Charles R. Schuster testified before the Senate that while
smoking "crack" cocaine produces a more intense "high" than snorting
cocaine, it is not more potent than taking cocaine intravenously. 269 Fur-
ther, crack is not more pure than powder cocaine.270 Supporters of the
crack disparity also pointed to its low cost. However, while crack is less
expensive than cocaine because of its smaller packaging, the per gram cost
is sometimes more expensive than powder cocaine. 271 Further, as wit-
nessed by the DEA report, Congress was simply wrong in asserting that
crack use was at epidemic levels. Finally, there is no evidence that the
smoking of crack cocaine leads to significantly more criminal activity than
the ingestion of powder cocaine.273
Even if there were a compelling interest for the 100:1 ratio of pow-
der versus crack cocaine, the crack statute was not narrowly tailored to
meet that government interest. The lower court in Clary noted that it is
illogical to punish users and dealers of the derivative source more than
those using and selling the original drug.274 Furthermore, the great dispar-
266. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
267. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 791 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
268. See id.
269. See "Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the
Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (testimony of Dr. Schuster).
270. See Gilimer, supra note 12, at 560-61 n.525; see also State v. Russell, 477 N.W.
2d 886, 890 (1991) (noting that "the mood altering ingredient in both powder and base
was the same-cocaine").
271. See Gillmer, supra note 12, at 561.
272. See supra note 205.
273. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 792; see also BELENKO, supra note 207 (discussing the
link between crime and crack cocaine).




ity in the punishment of African Americans compared to Whites, in
numbers grossly disproportionate to their use of the drug, forces African
Americans to shoulder more of the burden of achieving the government
interest of lowering the use of crack cocaine. Thus, because there is no
compelling need to warrant such a large disparity in sentencing between
crack and powder cocaine, and the means used to achieve that end are
not narrowly tailored, the crack cocaine sentencing scheme violates the
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause.
CONCLUSION
Race relations are dynamic. Beginning with George Wallace's
populist rhetoric in the 1960s, through racist appeals in the guise of
egalitarianism in the 1970s and 1980s, and continuing into the racist de-
bate on "values" in the 1990s, the American racial discourse has been
cloaked in the rhetoric of equality more often than not. In recent years,
even avowed White supremacists have begun to code their language to
obscure the fact that they preach racism.
The purpose of this article on "race coding" in American politics is
to emphasize that in today's muddled discourse on race, courts cannot
wait for the discovery of smoking gun evidence prior to finding legisla-
tors have acted with racist intent. Racists have caught on; smoking guns
are fewer and farther between. It is time for courts to make equally savvy
assessments.
This article argues that the federal government's crack cocaine sen-
tencing scheme violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment. By "de-coding" certain "coded" messages in the Congres-
sional Record and putting those comments in their proper historical
context, the racist intent becomes clear. There is a long history of Con-
gress passing legislation through blatant appeals to racist sentiment. Those
days have passed. However, while the enactment of modern legislation,
such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, may not be greased by overtly
racist rhetoric, injecting into the debate "colorblind slurs" that appeal to
Whites' fears has the same effects. Unfortunately, legislators will most
likely continue to pass legislation by coding their messages and sanitizing
their paper trail of racism. Hopefully, "de-coding" will serve as a useful
guide for not only challenging the crack cocaine sentencing scheme, but
also for scrutinizing other legislation where legislators may rely on racist
code words to garner support for laws that disproportionately harm peo-
ple of color.
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